Reconfiguration of the world power map: the rise of Asia-Pacific and the decline of the West
Gabriel Merino[1]
While the power pole that was dominant until the pandemic (although no longer hegemonic) shows more signs of relative decline, China has definitively become a global actor and seems willing to assume that role.
Deaths from Covid-19 per 100 inhabitants by country. Source: Prepared by the author based on data from Johns Hopkins University (12/10/2020)
The impact of the pandemic on the global power stage marked the beginning of a new geopolitical moment, as has already been discussed. indicatedWhile the power pole that was dominant until the pandemic (although no longer hegemonic) shows more signs of relative decline, China has definitively become a global actor and seems ready to assume that role, producing a qualitative leap in the structural trend of the Rise of Asia Pacific on the world power map and a relative decline of the West.
This is evident in various economic, social, technological, and military indicators, but we must also analyze a central element that is often overlooked or not given enough attention. By far, the Asia-Pacific countries and China, the world's most populous country with 1.400 billion inhabitants, demonstrated a far superior socio-political capacity in the face of the pandemic. Their ability to control the disease, maintain a very low death toll, and keep their economies functioning puts them in a much better position than other regions of the world, and especially compared to the situation in the United States, where a precipitous economic downturn is compounded by a health crisis.
The “Western-centric” perspective, which at times seems to sound self-congratulatory, attempts to explain this phenomenon by reducing it to the lack of “individual freedoms” in Asia-Pacific societies, due to their more “authoritarian” and “statist” cultural traditions. A whole new Orientalism. The South Korean philosopher Byung-Chul Han, who has lived in Germany for 30 years, reinforces this view (to which his origins contribute) when he states that:Japan, Korea, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore have an authoritarian mindset, which stems from their cultural tradition (Confucianism). People are less reluctant and more obedient than in Europe. They also trust the state more. And not only in China, but also in Korea and Japan, daily life is organized much more strictly than in Europe. [I]
This explanation, used from "left to right," sounds weak and biased. This is especially true when analyzed in light of Western history, rife with authoritarianism and totalitarianism, or when we consider the enormous surveillance and control system in the United States, operated in the name of national security and managed by government intelligence agencies. It also stems from the fact that the discretionary management of data, built by capturing every aspect of human personality through social media behavior, is handled in the West by private corporate monopolies (GAFA) associated with the Pentagon's Military-Industrial Complex. On the other hand, if we observe the profound revolutionary processes in the Asia-Pacific region and the insubordination of the popular classes in China or Vietnam, this idea of submissive "obedience," which seems to be confused with discipline (which serves both to obey and to rebel), becomes blurred.
Of course, culture plays a role and is fundamental to understanding collective behaviors. Nor can we ignore the lesser influence of the liberal bourgeois tradition in the Asia-Pacific region, both historically and in the present, and the lower level of individualism in these societies. Although this is not the focus of this article, we cannot fail to consider, as a hypothesis for further investigation, that it appears that in societies where neoliberal ultra-individualism—distinct from liberal individualism for which society exists— with less cultural and state influence, the collective response to the pandemic has been more effective and efficient.
Infrastructural power
Looking at the chart showing the number of deaths per country per 100 inhabitants, it becomes very clear that Asia-Pacific countries like China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan stand out for their extremely low levels in this indicator, in contrast to the West and Latin America. These countries also have very high population densities, and in the case of China, it is the most populous country in the world. Furthermore, they are not the "richest" countries as measured by their GDP per capita, and in the case of China, according to this indicator, it is a "middle-income" country, similar to Brazil. In other words, there is no direct correlation between wealth per person and the response to the pandemic.
These figures reflect, among other things, socio-state capacities, which would express what some authors, such as Michael Mann, have called the state's infrastructural power. This is defined as the state's capacity to truly penetrate civil society and logistically implement decisions. In reality, from the theoretical perspective we maintain here, rather than the state's capacity to "penetrate" civil society, it is the capacity of the state, as civil society plus political society (the state in the broadest sense, not only as a political society), to logistically implement decisions and accumulate/deploy tactical and strategic capacities. This implies an infrastructural materiality defined by the sum of physical, human, organizational, and institutional assets that make infrastructural power possible.[ii]
China has demonstrated enormous infrastructural power during the pandemic, evident both domestically and in its foreign policy. This was clear in the images showing the construction of a hospital in ten days, but also in the fact that in March, while the pandemic was still ravaging its territory, China exported 3.860 billion masks, 37,5 million protective suits, 16.000 ventilators, and 2,84 million COVID-19 test kits. In other words, it not only supplied its vast population with the necessary tools to combat COVID-19 at the height of the crisis, but also became the world's leading supplier of essential medical supplies and 80% of the world's pharmaceuticals.
This infrastructural power also translated into immense soft power and the capacity to lead international cooperation. Even raising the stakes, Xi Jinping declared before the UN that any vaccine his country develops against the disease will become a global public good, in contrast to most Western commercial projects. He also stated that the debt of poor countries should be forgiven and announced a contribution of $2000 billion to combat the coronavirus.
In a recent interview, retired Chinese general Qiao Liang, author of the famous book Unrestricted Warfare (Unrestricted Warfare) published in 1999, analyzes the situation in historical-spatial perspective: “The important thing is not to know how terrible the epidemic is but to realize that both the United States and the West have had their hour of glory and that they have now faced this epidemic while they are in decline.”[iii]
Zbigniew Brzezinski himself, one of the leading figures in US geopolitics and geostrategy, argues in his latest book Strategic Vision (Strategic Vision) published in 2013, the significant weaknesses of his country, which already showed a significant decline and the consequent loss of “leadership”. There he lists six critical aspects, which we can relate to the concept of the state's infrastructural power:
- Unsustainable debt and structural budget deficits.
- The flawed financial system, a systemic time bomb threatening not only the US but also the global economy due to its risky and self-aggrandizing behavior, has also created a growing moral hazard that is causing outrage in the country.
- The growing income inequality, coupled with the stagnation of social mobility, poses a long-term threat to social consensus and democratic stability, two conditions necessary for the maintenance of an effective US foreign policy.
- The decline of national infrastructure. The American Society of Civil Engineers, in its report on U.S. infrastructure, gave it a dismal grade of D: D in aviation, C- in rail, D- in highways, and D+ in energy. Reliable infrastructure is essential for efficiency and economic growth and simultaneously a symbol of the nation's overall dynamism. The state of U.S. infrastructure is now more representative of a declining power than of the world's most innovative economy. In a world where systemic rivalry between the United States and China is likely to intensify, this decaying infrastructure will be both a symbol and a symptom of America's malaise.
- A public that is very ignorant about what is happening in the world, which is also influenced lately by the deficient public education system.
- An increasingly congested and highly partisan political system (or polarized, in a less literal but more accurate translation).
Military power and influence in Asia Pacific
The relative decline of the United States and the Anglo-American power bloc is also reflected in the military sphere, which, along with financial and monetary power, seemed insurmountable for any rival less than two decades ago. However, the gap has narrowed. At the end of the Cold War, Chinese military spending represented just over 1% of global totals, according to calculations by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Now, Chinese military spending accounts for at least 14% of global totals, roughly a little over a third of US spending (38%), a gap that is shrinking considerably in real terms. And it continues to grow during the pandemic. Premier Li Keqiang announced a 6,6% increase in defense spending for 2021.
Throughout 2019, military spending reached $1,9 trillion worldwide, an increase of 3,6 percent in one year, reaching its highest level since the end of the Cold War – a clear indication of the current climate.
According to a report this year by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), China's fleet numbers 335 warships, while the United States has 285. Furthermore, the Chinese Navy launched its first aircraft carrier in 2012, its second last year, and aims to have four operational carriers by 2022. The central issue revealed by this report is that U.S. naval supremacy is in crisis in the Western Pacific, at the heart of which, the South China Sea, handles 30% of global trade and is the most dynamic region of the global economy. Adding to this is the fact that Beijing's new missile capabilities in the region are difficult for Washington to counter.
In this vein, it was announced in June that China will establish an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, where it has disputed territories with other countries in the region. This is in addition to the ADIZ established in 2013 in the East China Sea, where it maintains a territorial dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands.
Beijing is also consolidating its position in Hong Kong, through a new national security law, a territory considered a key Western outpost – a British colony until 1997 when it returned to Chinese control, but where Anglo-American power still has great influence.
On the other hand, in mid-April, Chinese media reported the government's decision to create two new districts as part of the city of Sansha, on the southern island of Hainan and part of the geostrategic outpost in the South China Sea.
In response to this situation, in July 2020, the United States deployed two aircraft carriers there and tried to reinforce its presence in the region, although the limits of American imperial power are becoming increasingly evident.
Until now, Washington claimed to maintain neutrality in territorial disputes. But starting on July 13, it aligned itself with Vietnam and the Philippines, through public statements by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (a member of the ultraconservative Tea Party and who is now leading a fierce rhetorical escalation against China, proposing a new Cold War): “Beijing’s claims to resources in non-coastal waters across most of the South China Sea are completely illegal, as is its campaign of coercion to control them.”And he added: "The world will not allow Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire."[iv]
This alignment also implies a break in the United States' role as arbiter in the region, a further indicator of the breakdown of hegemony.
The central point to analyze is that the geopolitical design of US hegemony since the end of World War II has included a red line in the Asia-Pacific region, marking the strategic boundary that a US- and Japanese-led coalition must maintain to prevent China from transitioning from a regional to a global power, which would imply the loss of Washington's global primacy. The South China Sea is precisely the key point on this map. Currently, this boundary has already been crossed in geostrategic terms, and the overlap is already underway.
Furthermore, both economically and through a range of multilateral institutions and initiatives, Beijing has made significant progress in the region. This is evident in the Asia-Pacific countries' accession to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the influence of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and their integration into the Belt and Road Initiative (also known as the New Silk Road), among others. These initiatives accelerated following the United States' withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership during the Trump administration.
China is also accelerating agreements and initiatives in key locations such as Pakistan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. Added to this, in the midst of the pandemic, was a historic 25-year agreement with Iran. All of this has significantly advanced its presence in the Indian Ocean. The agreement with Iran is a long-term commitment of Chinese investment in infrastructure to modernize the Persian country's industry, which obviously includes hydrocarbons, whose exports are currently blocked by the United States. This clearly challenges and partially dismantles this instrument of fierce economic warfare that Washington is waging against Tehran. It also includes agreements on military matters and the development of roads, telecommunications, and ports—among them the strategic Chabahar port, which India had taken over at the end of 2018 and is now being displaced from. This positions Iran as a key component of the Belt and Road Initiative. In this regard, in the case of railway infrastructure, the agreement focuses on the Tehran-Mashhad line that will connect with Afghanistan and the dry port of Khorgos, in Kazakhstan, completing the route of the “Silk Road Train” [v] and consolidating China's primacy in Central Asia, alongside Russia.
China is gaining influence every day on the Eurasian chessboard, the center of global geopolitics, and the pandemic has accelerated that.
The Limits of American Power
The limits of US power are also increasingly challenged by other powers, as evidenced by various events during the pandemic. As David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt, and Edward Wong point out [vi]The United States' rivals are testing the limits of its power in a situation of relative weakness and, we add here, a situation of deep fracture between globalists, Americanists and nationalists that polarizes the political system, and is exacerbated as contradictions within its ruling classes increase (as discussed in other articles).
One example cited to illustrate this boundary is the close approach of Russian fighter jets to US Navy aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea, while the Space Force was conducting an anti-satellite missile test. This appeared to be an attempt to send the message that Moscow could disable US spy satellites and disrupt the operation of global positioning systems and other communication systems. It was also noted that Russian fighter jets intercepted two Air Force B-1B bombers conducting a long-range training mission over the Black Sea, and that on at least three occasions during April and May, Russian fighter jets intercepted Navy P-8 surveillance aircraft over the Mediterranean. This comes on top of Russia's significant and successful intervention in Syria, which prevented the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government, as desired by Western and allied forces. Furthermore, Russia's increased involvement in Libya is seen as detrimental to the interests of the United States and other allied powers.
It is also no coincidence that, as a return to this pattern, former Soviet republics within Moscow's sphere of influence are experiencing significant political and strategic tensions (Belarus, Armenia-Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan). There, beyond internal problems, these power struggles are also playing out within the context of a hybrid and fragmented world war.
Another example of the challenges and limitations of US power would be Iran's actions in besieging US ships in the Persian Gulf and gradually accelerating its nuclear fuel production in response to Washington's withdrawal from the agreements. Or the sending of fuel shipments to Venezuela in open defiance of the blockade imposed by Trump on the South American country.
Looking at the region, we can point out that the victory of the Movement for Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia also represents a limit to that power. The hardline or old-style coup, politically led by Jeanine Añez, which included massacres of anti-coup protesters, persecution of opponents, public stonings, and widespread repression, did not achieve the support and collaboration of the United States, yet it still failed to prevail. The defeat of the alliance between the Bolivian oligarchy (particularly in Santa Cruz), the United States, the Brazilian government, and large US corporations and Anglo-American transnational financial networks to regain control of natural resources and geopolitical control of this key country, located in the heart of the continent, constitutes a significant event on the regional stage.
On the other hand, if we look at another central point of contention, at least for now, attempts at intervention in Venezuela and the "regime change" policy pursued by Washington and its allies have also failed. If this policy were to advance, it could lead to a situation in South America similar to that of Syria. However, in this case, the sanctions and economic blockade have been very effective in contributing to the destruction of the Caribbean nation's economy.
The pandemic has accelerated the timeline of the transition in the global power map and the relative decline of the United States. The situation is progressively evolving from a crisis of hegemony toward global disorder or systemic chaos. The nationalist-Americanist leadership assumed by Donald Trump exacerbated this process. The trade war is not proving effective in curbing Beijing, and attempts to impose a new Cold War as a geostrategic tool are less effective in today's deeply interconnected world, where China is becoming a central hub of the global economy (in productive, technological, commercial, and financial terms), with its state-owned conglomerates conquering the global market and proposing a new form of globalization. This is not the 70s, and China clearly does not represent the same challenge as the Soviet Union. It is a much greater challenge, within a process of profound qualitative global transformation.
A victory for Joe Biden [vii] It could bring back figures from globalist forces to the government, and they will probably try to resume the foreign policy agenda abandoned with the end of Barack Obama's term (Trans-Pacific Partnership and Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, attempts to strengthen multilateral institutions of the global north and establish the rules of the game for the 21st century, NATO expansion, resuming the agreement with Iran to distance the Persian country from China, etc.).[ viii])But for the moment the fracture and the stalemate will continue, while the discontent of the American working classes and anti-establishment sentiment will continue to grow, in a hyper-financialized and savage capitalism that has undermined the "American dream". Esto already less room for maneuver to sacrifice rights and well-being in the name of foreign policy.
[I] Byung-Chul Han, “The Viral Emergency and the World of Tomorrow”, El País, March 22, 2020.
[ii] On this and other concepts of Michael Mann and their use for development analysis, I recommend reading Eduardo Crespo and Marcelo Muñiz's "An Approach to the Global Conditions of Economic Development," in State and Public Policy Magazine, No. 8. May-September 2017. It is also worked on by Juan Cruz Margueliche and Solange Castañeda in the article “The New Silk Road in Latin America. Articulated infrastructure or infrastructural power?” IX Meeting of CERPI and the VII Conference of CENSUD “Argentina and Latin America, in a world of extremes”, La Plata, September 2019.
[iii] “Who Sets the Pace,” an interview with General Qiao Liang of Zijing (original publication in the magazine Bauhinia (from Hong Kong), translated by François Soulard, May 22, 2020. Available at: http://dangdai.com.ar/2020/05/22/quien-marca-el-ritmo/
[iv] Macarena Vidal Liy, “Danger of fire in Asian waters”, El País, July 25, 2020.
[v] Javier Vadell and Luciano Zaccara, “The historic China-Iran agreement on the Asian geopolitical chessboard”, in Perfil, August 18, 2020.
[vi] “As Virus Toll Concerns US, Rivals Test Limits of American Power”, The New York Times, June 3, 2020.
[vii] Regarding the elections in the United States, I recommend reading, among other works, the article by Leandro Morgenfeld “Elections 2020: the decline of the United States”, in El País Digital, August 29, 2020.
[viii] This is developed in depth in the work “Trade agreements and global struggles in the Trump era”, Economic Reality No. 313.
[1] Co-coordinator of the CLACSO Working Group on China and the World Power Map. UNLP, Argentina. Article published at https://www.elpaisdigital.com.ar/contenido/reconfiguracin-del-mapa-de-poder-ascenso-de-asia-pacfico-y-el-declive-de-occidente/28782
If you would like to receive more information about CLACSO's training programs:
[widget id=”custom_html-57″]
to our email lists.
