Conservative recomposition and institutional management of conflict in Honduras
Procedural democracy and the struggle for the state after the 2025 elections
Galel Briceño Cerrato[1]
Introduction
The Honduran political crisis following the 2025 general elections transcended the strictly electoral arena and revealed broader tensions related to democratic legitimacy, governance, and the institutional management of political conflict. Unlike the post-electoral crises of 2013 and 2017—marked by open confrontation and high levels of conflict—the post-2025 scenario showed a growing centrality of legal, electoral, and legislative procedures administered by strategic state institutions.
The National Electoral Council (CNE), the Electoral Court (TJE), the National Congress, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the Public Prosecutor's Office have acquired increasing relevance in the struggle for the institutional validation of the political process and for control of the mechanisms responsible for arbitrating democratic competition. Controversies related to special recounts, validation of tally sheets, electoral appeals, and legislative disputes have demonstrated a significant transformation in the contemporary ways of managing political disagreement in Honduras.
This shift of conflict into technical, legal, and administrative arenas must be understood within a broader trajectory of political reorganization following the 2009 coup. Over the past few decades, Honduras has experienced simultaneous processes of militarization of public security, the progressive judicialization of social conflicts, and the strengthening of institutional apparatuses for political control. The post-electoral crises of 2013 and 2017 revealed high levels of conflict and persistent questions about electoral legitimacy. The Electoral Observation Mission of the Organization of American States (OAS, 2017) recommended considering a repeat of the 2017 presidential elections due to substantial irregularities detected during the process, while the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights documented serious human rights violations stemming from post-electoral repression (OHCHR, 2018).
However, the scenario that emerged after the 2025 elections showed a significant shift compared to previous cycles. Post-election controversies began to increasingly reorganize themselves within institutional mechanisms for validation, challenge, and legal conflict management. Reuters (2025), El País (2025), Criterio.hn (2025), and Contracorriente (2025) documented delays, procedural conflicts, and institutional disputes that marked the Honduran post-election process.
From this perspective, this article analyzes the Honduran post-electoral crisis following the 2025 general elections and the first one hundred days of Nasry Asfura's government from a critical perspective of procedural democracy, state theory, and contemporary studies on juridification and lawfare in Latin America. Using a qualitative approach based on documentary analysis and newspaper reviews, the work examines the transformation of the post-electoral conflict into institutional spaces of political administration, the role played by the National Congress and the electoral and judicial bodies within the post-2025 reorganization, and the tensions between institutional stability and democratic legitimacy during the first one hundred days of the new government.
The central hypothesis argues that the institutional articulation between the National Party and sectors of the Liberal Party, supported by mechanisms of juridification and relative control of strategic organs of the State, allowed the consolidation of a conservative recomposition aimed both at stabilizing the government of Nasry Asfura and at strengthening future capacities of administration of the political system in the face of Libre as the main disruptive actor of the political equilibrium after 2009.
The article's main thesis argues that the controversies arising from the allegations of electoral fraud and irregularities in 2025 did not operate solely as a situational dispute over results, but as a mechanism for the institutional reorganization of the political conflict managed through legal, electoral, and legislative devices capable of transforming a dispute over democratic legitimacy into state stability.
Theoretical and methodological considerations
This work is developed from a qualitative, interpretive approach oriented towards the analysis of recent transformations of the Honduran political system after the 2025 general elections. The article combines political-structural analysis, documentary review and newspaper analysis with the purpose of examining contemporary processes of institutional proceduralization of political conflict, juridification of disagreement and conservative recomposition within the Honduran state apparatus.
The research is based on a documentary triangulation strategy constructed from national and international journalistic sources, reports from multilateral organizations, official resolutions, and specialized academic literature on liberal democracy, state theory, party systems, and lawfare in Latin America. Among the main sources used are documents from the Organization of American States (OAS), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as well as coverage from Reuters, El País, Criterio.hn, and Contracorriente.
The analysis stems from a critical perspective on procedural democracy and a relational reading of the state, primarily inspired by the contributions of Nicos Poulantzas, Jacques Rancière, Wendy Brown, and George Tsebelis. From this perspective, state institutions are not understood as neutral spaces of technical administration, but rather as arenas shaped by political and institutional power relations that actively intervene in the production of governance and democratic stability.
Methodologically, the article does not seek to legally demonstrate the existence of electoral fraud, but rather to analyze the ways in which the allegations of irregularities and the post-election controversies following the 2025 elections were progressively reorganized within legal, electoral, and legislative mechanisms for the institutional management of political conflict.
The temporal delimitation of the analysis covers the period between the general elections of November 2025 and the first one hundred days of the government of Nasry Asfura, also incorporating background after the 2009 coup d'état necessary to contextualize the contemporary reconfiguration of the Honduran political system.
I. Procedural democracy, party system and conservative recomposition
The Honduran political crisis following the 2025 elections compels a critical reassessment of contemporary forms of liberal democracy in contexts of high polarization, eroding institutional legitimacy, and a reorganization of power dynamics within the state. Rather than an exceptional anomaly, post-electoral conflict appears to express a form of political stabilization where democratic competition remains formally open while the effective capacity to manage conflict becomes increasingly concentrated within strategic state apparatuses.
This shift does not necessarily imply the formal suspension of democratic mechanisms. On the contrary, it reveals a transformation where elections, institutions, and legal procedures continue to operate under conditions increasingly mediated by power relations capable of shaping the real margins of political dispute. Rancière (1996) argues that contemporary democracies tend to displace political antagonisms toward specialized institutional mechanisms aimed at managing disagreement and preserving the continuity of the existing order.
The Honduran experience following the 2009 coup d'état is illustrative of this transformation. Successive political crises not only produced open confrontation but also a progressive strengthening of legal, electoral, and legislative bodies with a growing capacity for political reorganization. The expansion of the judicial system's powers, the centrality acquired by electoral bodies, and the increase in conflicts resolved through the courts demonstrate deeper transformations in the ways the state manages political conflict.
Within this scenario, the party system plays a decisive role. Sartori (2005) warns that parties are not merely vehicles for electoral representation, but structures capable of reorganizing power relations and redefining the effective limits of political competition. The emergence of Libre after the coup d'état significantly altered the historical two-party system dominated by the National Party and the Liberal Party; however, this transformation did not lead to the collapse of the adaptive capacities of the traditional forces. As Panebianco (2009) argues, parties develop strategies aimed at preserving state access, institutional reproduction, and the capacity for survival even in contexts of crisis.
The growing alliance between the National Party and sectors of the Liberal Party after the 2025 elections appears to be partly a response to this dynamic. Although both forces maintained historical differences and internal disputes, the post-election landscape showed increasing levels of legislative and institutional cooperation surrounding control of the National Congress and strategic bodies linked to the judicial and electoral systems.
From a structural perspective of the state, this convergence cannot be interpreted solely as a temporary parliamentary alliance. Poulantzas (1979) argues that the state constitutes a material condensation of power relations where different political and economic factions vie for control over strategic apparatuses. From this perspective, the relative control of institutions responsible for validating election results, processing appeals, and administering legal disputes becomes relevant not only for the immediate management of the conflict but also for the future organization of the conditions of political competition.
On the other hand, Tsebelis (2006) conceptualizes these institutional actors as veto players, that is, spaces with significant capacity to block or condition strategic decisions within the political system. Under certain power dynamics, the relative control of these bodies reduces uncertainty regarding future electoral cycles and strengthens governmental stabilization capabilities.
The central role acquired by the National Congress after the 2025 elections is particularly significant within this reorganization. Although Honduras continues to formally operate under a presidential system, much of the effective capacity for political articulation has begun to shift toward a legislative framework with increasing influence over strategic institutional decisions related to the electoral and judicial systems.
From this perspective, the post-election crisis of 2025 is not merely an episode of electoral conflict. It reflects a broader process of conservative reorganization where institutions, parties, and legal mechanisms are acquiring increasing capacity to manage political conflict, reorganize effective rules of competition, and reduce uncertainty in the face of future disputes over state power.
II. From the coup d'état to the conservative recomposition of the Honduran political system (2009–2025)
The coup d'état of June 2009 ushered in a new cycle of political reorganization in Honduras, characterized by a reconfiguration of the relationships between the state apparatus, the party system, and the mechanisms for managing political conflict. The removal of Manuel Zelaya not only produced a constitutional rupture but also an institutional transformation aimed at redefining the boundaries of political competition and restoring power dynamics favorable to historically dominant sectors within the Honduran political system.
The polarization resulting from the coup weakened the legitimacy of the traditional two-party system and favored the emergence of Libre as a force with the real capacity to challenge state control through a confrontational narrative against the political order built after 2009. However, this transformation did not lead to the collapse of the adaptive capacities of the traditional forces. On the contrary, it encouraged new forms of political and institutional articulation aimed at preserving stability and control over strategic state apparatuses.
During the political cycle led by Juan Orlando Hernández (2014–2022), this reorganization deepened. The militarization of public security, the strengthening of coercive apparatuses, and the increasing judicialization of social conflicts began to redefine the forms of state management of political dissent. Several reports by the IACHR and the OHCHR highlighted persistent concerns related to institutional concentration, the weakening of checks and balances, and political conflict.
The 2017 elections marked a decisive turning point. The disruption of the preliminary results transmission system, allegations of irregularities in the vote count, and the subsequent reelection of Juan Orlando Hernández produced one of the most intense post-election crises in recent history. The OAS Electoral Observation Mission concluded that the irregularities detected prevented full confidence in the process and recommended considering a repeat election (OAS, 2017). Meanwhile, Reuters (2017) and BBC Mundo (2017) documented mass protests, confrontations, and widespread questioning of democratic legitimacy.
The state's response to that crisis combined direct coercion, progressive judicialization, and institutional validation of results. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2018) documented deaths linked to the post-election context and allegations of excessive use of force against post-election demonstrations. The experience yielded a relevant political lesson: open confrontation entailed high national and international costs for governmental stability.
The political landscape after 2022 introduced new tensions into this trajectory. Although Libre's arrival in the Executive branch represented a partial break from the previous cycle, the disputes surrounding the National Congress, the Public Prosecutor's Office, and the electoral bodies demonstrated that the political conflict was increasingly reorganizing itself around strategic institutions responsible for managing political and electoral controversies.
The arrival of Johel Zelaya at the Public Prosecutor's Office in 2024 intensified debates about institutional selectivity and the political use of judicial resources. Radio Progreso (2025) and Criterio.hn (2025) documented controversies related to prosecutorial investigations, court orders, and disputes over institutional autonomy. Simultaneously, internal tensions within the National Electoral Council and the Electoral Court demonstrated that disputes over control of the electoral system were beginning to acquire increasing political significance.
The 2025 general elections brought to a head much of this accumulated tension. Unlike in 2017, the conflict was not primarily expressed through an immediate institutional breakdown, but rather through administrative, legal, and legislative procedures related to the special scrutiny, validation of tally sheets, and institutional management of the disagreement. Reuters (2025) reported delays and conflicts associated with the vote count, while El País (2025) documented statements by the National Electoral Council (CNE) characterizing certain blockages and pressures on the count as threats to democracy.
Marlon Ochoa's role within the National Electoral Council proved particularly significant. His questions regarding procedural inconsistencies and the validation of tally sheets reflected internal tensions within the electoral body. Criterio.hn (2025) and Contracorriente (2025) documented complaints about irregularities and public disagreements among council members, demonstrating that the political conflict was beginning to shift within the very structures responsible for producing electoral legitimacy.
However, the political significance of 2025 did not lie solely in the conflict surrounding the election results. The alliance between the National Party and sectors of the Liberal Party within the National Congress allowed them to consolidate a majority capable of influencing strategic bodies linked to the judicial, electoral, and legislative systems.
From a structural perspective, this convergence can be interpreted as a conservative recomposition aimed at reducing political uncertainty and strengthening institutional capacities for intervention in the Honduran political system. Under this logic, the 2025 post-electoral conflict expressed less an exceptional dispute over results and more a strategic reorganization of the future conditions of political competition.
III. 2025 Elections, proceduralization of conflict and institutional management of disagreement
The 2025 general elections marked a significant transformation in contemporary forms of managing political conflict in Honduras. Unlike the 2017 post-electoral crisis—characterized by open confrontation, abrupt interruptions, and high levels of direct coercion—the conflict arising from the new electoral process began to be progressively reorganized within technical, legal, and administrative procedures capable of absorbing political antagonisms without producing an immediate breakdown of the institutional order.
This shift did not imply the disappearance of the dispute over democratic legitimacy. On the contrary, it revealed a shift in the conflict toward the institutions responsible for administering the electoral process. Controversies began to take shape around the validation of tally sheets, special recounts, challenges, and technical disputes over the transmission of results. The conflict did not disappear; it simply changed terrain.
The National Electoral Council became the primary arena for these tensions. Internal disputes among council members and public disagreements over the validation of tally sheets demonstrated that the electoral institution was simultaneously operating as the formal arbiter of the process and as a stage for political confrontation. The public actions of Marlon Ochoa, who questioned decisions related to contested tally sheets, procedural inconsistencies, and electoral validation mechanisms, acquired particular significance.
Criterio.hn (2025) documented complaints related to irregularities during the special recount and disagreements regarding the handling of certain tally sheets. Contracorriente (2025) reported internal conflicts within the electoral body linked to delays and questions about institutional transparency. Reuters (2025) also reported tensions arising from the special vote recount, while El País (2025) documented statements from the National Electoral Council (CNE) itself describing pressure and obstruction of the count as threats to democracy.
The political significance of these events transcends the strictly administrative issues of the electoral process. The disputes surrounding tally sheets, procedures, and timelines demonstrated that control of the electoral apparatus was beginning to acquire strategic centrality within the Honduran political reorganization. The technical administration of results ceased to be a merely procedural matter and became a decisive arena for defining institutional capacities for intervention in the political system.
From the perspective of veto player theory, Tsebelis (2006) argues that certain institutional actors acquire the strategic capacity to reshape political decisions in contexts of high uncertainty. In Honduras, the relative control exerted by bodies capable of validating results, processing challenges, and managing electoral disputes has significantly reduced uncertainty regarding future scenarios of political competition.
Post-election conflict thus began to transform into an increasingly proceduralized controversy. Concepts such as “inconsistent tally sheets,” “special review,” “audit,” and “technical validation” began to dominate the public debate, progressively displacing broader discussions about political representation and democratic legitimacy. Technical electoral language operated as a mechanism for the symbolic reorganization of the conflict, reframing political questions as administrative problems susceptible to institutional resolution.
This dynamic is consistent with Rancière's (1996) observations on the contemporary management of political disagreement. Under certain conditions, liberal democracies displace structural antagonisms into specialized procedures where conflict remains active but is reorganized within limits compatible with preserving the existing political order.
However, the technical nature of these procedures does not imply political neutrality. As Rivera Lugo (2022) and Romano (2019) point out, the progressive juridification of conflict constitutes a contemporary form of political reorganization where structural disputes are encapsulated within administrative and legal mechanisms capable of producing institutional legitimacy.
The Honduran experience following the 2025 elections demonstrated precisely this dynamic. Tensions surrounding the National Electoral Council (CNE) did not lead to an immediate institutional breakdown; instead, they contributed to a gradual shift of the conflict toward administrative appeals, legal validations, and specialized disputes within the electoral and judicial systems.
The main consequence of this process was not solely the temporary stabilization of the election results. The proceduralization of the conflict strengthened the strategic relevance of electoral, legal, and legislative bodies within the Honduran political arena. The struggle for the state thus began to increasingly shift toward the control of the institutions responsible for administering democratic competition itself.
IV. National Congress, political trials and reorganization of governance
The official declaration of election results did not effectively end the Honduran political crisis following the 2025 elections. On the contrary, the conflict began to shift from the strictly electoral arena to institutional spaces capable of influencing the administration of the political system. In this scenario, the National Congress acquired increasing centrality as a space for political leadership and intervention in electoral and judicial bodies strategic to stabilizing the new post-electoral equilibrium.
Although the executive branch led by Nasry Asfura retained a prominent public role as the visible representative of the new government, much of the effective capacity for political reorganization began to shift toward parliamentary majorities with influence over institutions linked to the validation and management of political conflict. Under these conditions, the problem ceased to be focused solely on who held the presidency and began to shift toward controlling the apparatuses responsible for processing electoral and legal disputes.
The parliamentary alliance between the National Party and sectors of the Liberal Party proved decisive in this reorganization. Although both forces maintained historical differences, the post-election scenario showed increasing levels of convergence around institutional control and the need to stabilize the new political order in the face of Libre as the main disruptive actor in the equilibrium built after the 2009 coup.
This dynamic became particularly visible with the initiation of impeachment proceedings in the National Congress against officials linked to the National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Electoral Court of Justice (TJE). In April 2026, Congress approved the opening of impeachment proceedings against CNE council member Marlon Ochoa, as well as against TJE magistrates involved in the 2025 electoral process (TNH, 2026). The significance of these events extends beyond the strictly legal issue of impeachment as a constitutional mechanism for public accountability. The decisive factor lies in the type of institutions targeted—that is, bodies responsible for managing electoral disputes and institutionally validating the political process.
The case of Marlon Ochoa proved particularly illustrative due to the tensions arising from the institutional handling of the special recount and the internal disputes within the National Electoral Council (CNE). Criterio.hn (2025), Contracorriente (2025), and Infobae (2026) documented irregularities, procedural disagreements, and political controversies linked to the electoral process and the subsequent impeachment proceedings initiated by the National Congress.
A similar dynamic began to emerge with respect to the Electoral Court. The inclusion of TJE magistrates in the impeachment trials showed that the conflict extended beyond the National Electoral Council (CNE) and was beginning to encompass the entire institutional framework responsible for processing electoral and legal disputes.
The Supreme Court of Justice was also caught up in this scenario of institutional pressure. In April 2026, Rebeca Raquel Obando resigned as president of the Supreme Court amidst growing political tensions and debates fueled by the National Congress (El País Honduras, 2026). Although she continued as a magistrate, the episode demonstrated the direct effects of parliamentary pressure on the judicial system.
The Public Prosecutor's Office was also affected by this reorganization. The figure of the Attorney General, Johel Zelaya, acquired increasing centrality in the post-election disputes due to the Public Prosecutor's Office's capacity to initiate investigations and criminal proceedings with high political impact. Radio Progreso (2025) and Criterio.hn (2025) documented debates related to institutional selectivity and the political use of judicial resources.
From a structural perspective, this process cannot be reduced to personal disputes between officials. As Poulantzas (1979) argues, the struggles for control of strategic state apparatuses relate to the capacity to intervene in the conditions for the reproduction of political power. Under this logic, the struggle for control of bodies such as Congress, the National Electoral Council (CNE), the Electoral Tribunal (TJE), the Supreme Court, and the Public Prosecutor's Office not only allowed for the management of current conflicts but also for intervention in the rules under which future political controversies would be processed.
The literature on lawfare allows for a deeper understanding of this interpretation. Rivera Lugo (2022) and Romano (2019) argue that contemporary forms of political judicialization increasingly operate through formally legitimate mechanisms aimed at reorganizing political correlations and conditioning democratic competition.
The Honduran scenario after 2025 displayed features consistent with this dynamic. Impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress functioned simultaneously as constitutional procedures and as mechanisms of institutional discipline aimed at strengthening control over strategic organs of the political system. The dispute thus ceased to unfold exclusively in the electoral arena and began to shift toward the institutions responsible for arbitrating and administering future democratic competition.
The conservative recomposition following the 2025 elections did not depend solely on the electoral outcome, but also on the ability to institutionally reorganize the Honduran political system and condition the rules under which future disputes for state power will be managed.
V. Political economy of governance: institutional stability, material deterioration and political legitimacy
The relative institutional stabilization following the 2025 elections did not automatically translate into the consolidation of political legitimacy or the resolution of the structural tensions that have historically plagued Honduran society. Although the institutional reorganization promoted by the National Congress reduced immediate political uncertainty and partially contained post-electoral conflict, the first hundred days of Nasry Asfura's government unfolded under conditions marked by persistent poverty, a deteriorating cost of living, external dependence, and increasing fiscal constraints.
This scenario is relevant because it reveals a central contradiction in the new political equilibrium: while institutional governance appeared to be strengthening, economic conditions persisted that could erode social legitimacy and fuel future conflict. The stabilization of the state apparatus did not necessarily coincide with a corresponding improvement in the material conditions for social reproduction.
Although Honduras maintained relatively moderate inflation levels during 2025–2026 compared to other Latin American countries, the sustained increase in fuel, food, and transportation prices continued to disproportionately affect low-income sectors historically vulnerable to fluctuations in real income (IMF, 2026; BCH, 2026). La Prensa (2026) and El Heraldo (2026) document growing citizen concerns related to the decline in purchasing power and pressure on household spending.
The relative macroeconomic stability also rests on structurally fragile conditions. The Honduran economy remains highly dependent on remittances, multilateral financing, and external dynamics that limit internal economic room for maneuver. Remittances have been and continue to be crucial for sustaining consumption and exchange rate stability, simultaneously revealing the persistence of an economy unable to fully absorb its workforce through internal mechanisms of productive integration (World Bank, 2026; Coface, 2026).
The persistence of high levels of informal employment and poverty exacerbates this tension. Despite a degree of inherited macroeconomic stability, large segments of society continue to rely on precarious and unstable incomes, while historical deficits persist regarding employment, access to services, and the material reproduction of daily life. Under these conditions, governmental legitimacy can hardly be sustained solely on institutional stability or the procedural management of political conflict.
From a critical perspective, this contradiction expresses structural limitations of contemporary governance. Fraser (2023) argues that current capitalist crises simultaneously involve economic deterioration, erosion of political legitimacy, and tensions related to social reproduction. In Honduras, the relative institutional stabilization following the 2025 elections coexisted with persistent precarious material conditions capable of continuously straining the new political equilibrium.
The role of multilateral organizations is becoming increasingly important in this context. The agreement reached with the International Monetary Fund serves as a financial stabilization mechanism and a signal of international confidence, while the Central American Bank for Economic Integration continues to play a crucial role by financing infrastructure and strategic programs for the country's economic stability (IMF, 2026; CABEI, 2026).
However, dependence on external financing also introduces significant constraints. As Brown (2015) warns, contemporary neoliberal rationales are progressively shifting democratic politics toward forms of technical administration where macroeconomic stability takes precedence over redistributive demands and immediate social needs. Under these conditions, the government's capacity to expand social spending or sustain subsidies is increasingly limited by demands for fiscal discipline and financial stability.
The tension between macroeconomic stability and social legitimacy thus became a central issue during the first hundred days of Nasry Asfura's government. Although the new political equilibrium demonstrated the capacity to institutionally reorganize the political system and reduce immediate post-election uncertainty, it continues to face limitations stemming from the material conditions of existence for broad sectors of society.
From this perspective, the conservative realignment following the 2025 elections demonstrated the capacity to stabilize the Honduran state apparatus, but not necessarily to resolve the structural contradictions that continue to permeate Honduran society. Institutional governance partially contained the political conflict; however, tensions stemming from poverty, inequality, and economic insecurity remained persistent constraints on the consolidation of lasting democratic legitimacy.
Conclusions
The Honduran political crisis following the 2025 general elections is not merely a temporary electoral controversy. It reflects a broader transformation in contemporary forms of institutional management of political conflict within a liberal democracy marked by high polarization, eroding legitimacy, and persistent structural inequalities. The post-electoral scenario demonstrated that political stability no longer depends solely on the ability to win elections, but also on the relative control of the apparatuses responsible for validating, interpreting, and administering them.
Unlike the 2017 crisis, characterized by open confrontation and high repressive costs, the post-2025 scenario revealed a growing capacity of the Honduran political system to channel antagonisms into legal, electoral, and legislative procedures capable of absorbing conflict without producing an immediate breakdown of governance. Under these conditions, the proceduralization of conflict began to operate simultaneously as a mechanism for institutional stabilization and as a form of political reorganization of disagreement.
In this process, the National Congress acquired a particularly significant centrality. The alliance between the National Party and sectors of the Liberal Party allowed them to consolidate a parliamentary majority with the capacity to intervene in electoral, jurisdictional, and judicial bodies strategic for managing the political conflict following the elections. The impeachment proceedings brought against officials linked to the National Electoral Council and the Electoral Court demonstrated how formally constitutional mechanisms can simultaneously operate as instruments of institutional discipline and a reorganization of power dynamics within the state apparatus.
From a structural perspective, the struggle for control of institutions such as the National Congress, the National Electoral Council (CNE), the Electoral Tribunal (TJE), the Supreme Court of Justice, and the Public Prosecutor's Office demonstrated that contemporary democratic competition is not organized exclusively around voting, but also around the control of bodies capable of arbitrating, validating, and processing the actual conditions of political dispute. The conservative realignment following the 2025 elections responded precisely to this logic of reducing political uncertainty and strengthening institutions in the face of Libre, the main disruptive force in the political equilibrium established after the 2009 coup.
However, this institutional stabilization showed persistent limitations. The first hundred days of Nasry Asfura's government were marked by economic decline, social instability, and tensions stemming from historical structural constraints. Relative political stability thus coexisted with material conditions capable of eroding social legitimacy and reigniting future conflict.
The Honduran experience after 2025 reveals a constitutive tension of contemporary liberal democracies: while they preserve formal procedures for political competition, the effective struggles for power are increasingly shifting toward legal, electoral, and legislative institutions subject to intense correlations of partisan and class power. Under these conditions, procedural democracy can preserve institutional continuity while simultaneously reorganizing or limiting the effective margins for political transformation.
Rather than the definitive end of a crisis, the 2025 elections appear to have inaugurated a new stage of institutional reorganization of the Honduran political system where democratic stability will increasingly depend on the state's capacity to manage persistent social antagonisms without resolving the structural inequalities that continue to permeate Honduran society.
[1] Honduran sociologist with postgraduate studies in political analysis and government. His research focuses on the state, democracy, political conflict, and inequality in Central America. Member of the Honduran Sociological Association.
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3056-8284
Email: [email protected]
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