The Yellow Vests, a French mirror of a universal democratic crisis
On the first anniversary of the outbreak of the so-called movement of the
“Yellow vests” in France: an analysis by a French researcher Jean Jacques Kourliandsky, Director of the Observatory
Latin America from the Jean Jaurès Foundation in Paris.
https://jean-jaures.org/
Since November 17, 2018, France has been experiencing a prolonged period of social protest, difficult to define, popularized as the "yellow vest" movement. This name arose "naturally" because of the distinctive yellow vests adopted by the protesters, giving them visibility and a sense of identity.
There is no shortage of attempts at explanation, none of them satisfactory. Many reflect the moral or political biases of their authors. Others propose keys that allow us to open, but only partially, doors to understanding.
This crisis, in the author's view, has both circumstantial and structural factors. The former are undoubtedly national, specifically French. The latter, expressed through the trappings of an indigenous culture, reflect the universal crisis of democracies in the globalized world.
CONJUNCTURAL FACTORS
Go hechos:
The initial factor was the French government's announcement of a gasoline price increase, ostensibly to protect the environment. The increase was 3 euro cents per liter for regular gasoline and 6 cents for diesel. [1] This decision was the trigger. The rejection of the gasoline price increase, especially for diesel, was shared by many people spontaneously, without the need for a mobilization campaign.
Social media facilitated awareness of the universality of the protest. The first protest message was posted online on May 29, 2018, by Priscilla Ludosky, a woman living in the Paris suburbs. It was copied and shared a million times between May and October of that year. On October 10, two truck drivers, Eric Drouet and Bruno Lefevre, who shared Priscilla Ludosky's frustration with the tax burden, used the same technological channels to call for a demonstration, blocking highways and occupying roundabouts. This message was amplified on October 18 by a video from another woman, Jacline Mouraud, an accordion player from western France, which was copied six million times.
In a short time, France was paralyzed. Thousands of "Yellow Vests" blocked major roads and roundabouts across the country. They gathered every weekend in the most popular tourist areas of Paris and in the centers of other major cities to express their discontent and demands. After a month, the situation began to cripple the economy. Businesses weren't receiving supplies, commerce ground to a halt, and tourists began to panic and cancel their reservations.
Week after week, phenomena of radicalization and violence, both verbal and physical, were observed. There were deaths, about ten. People died in accidents or incidents at the roadblocks set up by the "Yellow Vests." And not in clashes between police and protesters [2] . But there was an overreaction by the public security forces, who seriously injured many protesters.
The government offered dialogue. But there were no negotiations between protesters and authorities. Despite—or perhaps because of—this lack of dialogue, President Emmanuel Macron announced on December 10, 2018, not only that the price of gasoline would not be increased, but also that he was partially repealing the tax he had created on pensions and advancing the payment of a bonus for employees earning the minimum wage.
Throughout these events, no political party, whether right-wing or left-wing, nor any trade union or representative association of “civil society,” played any role as moderators, intermediaries, or instigators. “It is a pure event: unprecedented, inventive, uncontrollable. (…) It overwhelmed social organizations, shook professional commentators, and frightened the government,” wrote journalist Edwy Plenel. [3]
All of this raises five questions that we will try to address by offering some clues to understanding.
1/ Why gasoline ? There were other taxes created by President Macron's government since his election victory in June 2017. And nothing happened.
2/ Why were there no demonstrations by residents in the cities and their outskirts? Why were these demonstrations in the countryside, on highways, roundabouts, or road junctions? And not in Paris or the major urban centers? Why did the demonstrators travel to the city centers on weekends to voice their discontent?
3/ Why this progressive radicalization of the protest movement? Why this high number of victims, both fatal and seriously injured, a phenomenon completely unprecedented in social protests in France?
4/ Why was there no dialogue with the government? And how can we understand, unlike classic social conflicts, the rapid government defeat, with the president announcing on television that he understood the protest and that he was canceling the announced measures?
5/ Why this absence in all this conflict of intermediary bodies, political parties, such as unions, NGOs and parliamentarians?
RESPONSES IN STRUCTURAL FACTORS
Answering these questions, or at least attempting to do so, requires identifying structural explanatory factors. These factors, expressed in ways specific to French social culture, reflect a malaise common in many democracies [4] . We will examine the five questions stated above, using a binocular approach that combines the search for national factors with universal implications.
1/ Why did the increase in gasoline prices have a greater impact than other fiscal measures by the Macron government?
The Yellow Vests protested after a gasoline price hike. This increase followed other tax measures that had not previously provoked resistance. However, this latest increase reignited the protests, triggering a final surge in discontent. Since June 2017, President Macron has implemented the following tax measures: increased tax burden on pensioners [5] , erosion of pensions [6] , reduction of housing subsidies [7] , controls on unemployment benefits, elimination of the tax paid by the wealthiest [8] , and expansion of aid programs for businesses [9].
The “Yellow Vests” expressed a feeling of fiscal injustice [10] . This sentiment was held back until the decision to increase the price of diesel fuel due to the price difference between the two types of fuel. Measures affecting students or pensioners could be tolerated as long as the significant portion of income spent by those in rural or peripheral France on car transportation remained untouched.
The decision to increase diesel fuel prices sparked a shift in public awareness, a shift in the tax burden from the wealthiest to the poorest. “They didn’t rise up against the tax itself, but against its unfair distribution,” says Edwy Plenel. [11] This sentiment is shared in many democracies around the world, where ordinary citizens notice the slow erosion of the welfare state, at least in European countries where some form of welfare state existed. In the European Union, member states must adhere to the rule of a budget deficit below 3% of GDP. This justified, from one country to another, fiscal measures affecting the middle and lower-middle classes. There were limitations on pension increases, salary freezes or cuts for public employees, and precarious employment contracts in the private sector, as seen in Spain, Greece, and Portugal, for example.
2/ Why is the "yellow vest" movement a movement originating in the interior of France? A territorialized social movement?
The indignation of the “Yellow Vests” has a very unique characteristic in that it is a territorialized indignation. It expresses a social demand from territories or from French people who feel forgotten by the government and their fellow citizens in the city centers. The protesters are people who live in “peripheral” areas, located “between” urban centers classified as metropolises. They pay taxes that are invested in these cities to finance works they do not use: public transport, high-level facilities—universities, hospitals, cultural centers. At the same time, they are experiencing a reorganization in their territories that reflects a market logic [12].
Public authorities, at the central, regional, and local levels, favored a “liberal” reorganization of territories. This promoted urban planning centered around cities, concentrating public services and service companies, and, in the peripheries, creating open residential developments of individual houses, punctuated by giant shopping malls every 10-15 kilometers. The latest territorial reorganization law adopted by François Hollande's government reflects this approach: a “rationalized” territory designed to adapt to competition among territories within the European Union.
Peripheral territories are subject to the same per capita investment ratio as densely populated areas. This concept has been accepted for at least 50 years by urban planners, architects, and elected officials at the national and local levels [13] . This results in the concentration of public services—schools, health centers, courts, theaters—in “central” locations every 10 to 30 kilometers [14] . This imposes additional costs on residents of peripheral areas who, like all consumers and citizens, must adapt to the outsourcing and increasing digitization of public services. This means acquiring at least a computer, a printer, and a cell phone to make purchases and carry out administrative procedures [15].
The “Yellow Vests” then mobilized against what they perceive as a lack of national solidarity. Wealthy areas, large cities, increasingly capture the country's wealth. They live outside these cities, either by birth or out of social necessity [16] . They had to leave the city centers because of life's ups and downs (illness, divorce, unemployment) or because they had children. And they cannot afford housing, whether to buy or rent. They then moved beyond the slums or peri-urban suburbs, territories of housing—beehives, settlements of migrant workers—to live in the countryside or between suburbs and the countryside. Places where they can have a house and a garden. But they need a car to go shopping, to work, to take the children to school, or occasionally to a hospital or a court. Raising gasoline prices in this context meant adding a territorialized fiscal burden to their social marginalization.
This lack of territorial solidarity is not specifically French. All European countries experience it in their own way. They are subject to the same territorial constraints, the result of territorial and social reorganization linked to the logic of the globalized market society. Both eastern Germany and the United Kingdom are experiencing phenomena of territorial marginalization. In Belgium, Spain, and Italy, wealthy regions that are unwilling to share their wealth with poorer ones increase the feeling of exclusion.
3/4/ Why did this movement lack an organizational structure? Why was there violence at an unprecedented level in social movements in France? Why was there no dialogue or negotiation?
The expression of outrage was massive but minimally organized. Those who shared the indignation used social media to coordinate meeting places and collectively express their rejection of the government's planned gasoline price increase. There was no organizational structure to channel the demonstrations and ensure they proceeded peacefully. Nor was there an institutional framework for the movement capable of negotiating with authorities, governors, or the central government at both the local and national levels.
This helps explain how quickly external elements—right-wing or left-wing extremist groups, sometimes criminals—were present at the demonstrations and instigated riots and violence. It also helps explain the structural absence of dialogue, due to the lack of a "Yellow Vest" counterweight to the government.
An expression of fiscal and emotional weariness, fueled by digital technology and manifesting as massive street protests, this movement has nothing to do with the popular mobilizations channeled by parties and unions, such as those that accompanied the French Popular Front in May and June of 1936. Nor does it resemble the May 1968 protests in France, ignited by ultra-leftist student groups and channeled through the major unions.
They are more akin to the collective “emotions” of recent years, which in various countries revealed a massive and popular spontaneous protest movement, whose mobilization was fueled by social media. In Spain, thousands of ordinary citizens, mobilized by SMS, came together on March 13, 2004, to deny ETA's responsibility for the March 11 Madrid bombings, a claim defended by the Aznar government [17] . In 2005, the French suburbs burned for weeks, revealing, through a dramatic police incident, the discontent and hardship of life in the urban peripheries. A few years later, similar popular movements emerged without warning in Spain (the Indignados, in 2011), in Tunisia (2010), in Egypt and Libya (the Arab Spring in 2011), in Turkey and Brazil (in 2013) [18].
In each of these cases, the governments denounced manipulation or instrumentalization by alleged internal or external actors. Before acknowledging, in one way or another, the atypical and national character of the protests, they responded by: agreeing to the protesters' demands (Brazil in 2013; France in 2018), offering a scapegoat to the protesters (Egypt), calling elections (Tunisia), initiating an institutional transition (Tunisia), or brutally confronting the social movement (Egypt, Syria, Turkey).
The response, following the tax announcements and the suspension of the environmental tax, was judicial and police-led. This was especially true after the December 1st demonstrations on the Champs-Élysées and the attempted destruction of the national symbol of the Arc de Triomphe. From November 17, 2018, to June 29, 2019, 2.948 people were taken into police custody. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights alerted French authorities on March 6, 2019, to their “excessive use of police force.”
5/ How to understand the absence of all political and social intermediation bodies: parties, unions, NGOs, parliamentarians?
In all these cases, and particularly in the last one, that of the "Yellow Vests," at least initially, the absence of the intermediary bodies present in every democratic system raises a serious question. Political parties, both opposition and those in the parliamentary majority, unions, and organized civil society were mere spectators of the events. They did attempt to comment on, participate in, and some even tried to exploit the movement. Without success.
But they had to observe how an unorganized movement, which arose suddenly and without any negotiation, managed in a month to win the open struggle against a government with a president legitimately elected in 2017, supported by a strong parliamentary majority [19] , and the benevolence of the media. They won paradoxically because they had no form of representation or delegation. And when they began to demonstrate in the most touristic neighborhoods and those of the urban elites, the authorities had no other option but repression or capitulation [20].
The protesters then realized that to achieve their goals, they didn't need to delegate their representation to parties, unions, or associations. Following the same path of social media, the demand for what they call a Citizen Initiative Referendum (RIC) [21] emerged in the demonstrations. In other words, a form of government that wouldn't require members of parliament, senators, a president, nor unions or NGOs.
This reflects a growing trend toward abstention from one election to the next. With 77,7% and 74,5% turnout, participation fell by 1,7% in the first round of the 2017 presidential election and by 5,8% in the second. Participation was even lower in the 2017 parliamentary elections, with abstention at 51,3% in the first round and 57,36% in the second. Abstention is also prevalent in party and union memberships, which are very low . “The working classes have begun a long process of political and cultural disaffiliation,” summarizes geographer Christophe Guilluy. He concludes: “From the suburbs to peripheral France, it is the whole of popular classes that are disengaging from a system of political, trade union, and media representation” [22] (The popular classes have begun a long process of political and cultural disaffiliation. From the suburbs to peripheral France, the entire popular class is freeing itself from the system of political, trade union, and media representation).
President Macron is a reflection of this crisis of representative democracy. He won by publicly displaying his lack of political experience. He rejected the relevance of conducting politics with references to the right and left. He called on those who shared his non-partisan vision to send him their resumes to run in the legislative elections. He did so in the name of a new movement, "En Marche!" (On the March), structured in a top-down manner.
This deepened the distance between voters and their representatives. By suspending the use of direct numerical democracy, she chose candidates for parliament with no political experience or party affiliation—young people from the entrepreneurial sector. The elected Chamber is socially the most elitist in French parliamentary history: 31% of the deputies are executives and 18% are lawyers or doctors. Only one is a worker [23] . She further widened the gap between representation and the people by announcing an institutional reform with an anti-parliamentary ideology. She unwittingly founded a “market democracy” with fewer deputies, prioritizing citizen dialogue and efficiency, and equating the legislature with the supposed agility of a company's top management.
Further undermining a representative democracy already in crisis, President Macron confirmed the democratic doubts of those who harbored them, the “secession of the elites” [24] , the disconnect between ordinary voters and their representatives. And he unwittingly aided the work of those who infiltrate democratic institutions [25].
Therefore, the actors within the democratic system—both opposition and government, elected officials, and representatives of trade unions and social organizations—were mere spectators of a larger social movement. They failed to perceive it, to understand it, and offered it no institutional solutions. They did, however, attempt to engage with it, sending messages of understanding. In the case of the opposition, they joined in the criticism of the government and the president, with the aim of gaining electoral support a few months before the upcoming European elections. Hypotheses and polls emerged, measuring the movement's impact on the outcome of these elections. Rumors also circulated regarding the potential impact of an independent "Yellow Vest" list in this election. Everyone tried to include some "Yellow Vests" on the lists or "help" some "Yellow Vests" to run [26].
Forgetting the deep logic of a movement, a logic of divorce or institutional political internship [27] . Internship that is the consequence of the policies of the rulers. With, as a result, “a regression of democracy and the unleashing of violence [28] ”.
PARTIAL, PROVISIONAL, AND REVISABLE CONCLUSIONS
The “Yellow Vest” crisis, like others, has its reasons.
It emerged as a territorialized social fracture that requires broader analysis and diagnosis. The response to this crisis cannot be merely respectful of the system, limiting political life to a beauty pageant, a spectacle fueled by polls. It would then function like market politics, or a football championship, with untouchable rules, combined with a change of team and captain every four or five years. Behind this crisis lies a deep, globalized social fracture that warrants further reflection. Here, the only point made was the lack of analysis of the growing contradiction between democracy and the globalized economy, between social democracy and environmentally responsible democracy.
+ Disappearance of political alternatives . Until 1991, until the end of the Cold War, France had a political system that offered real alternatives to voters. Within a shared democratic framework, the right was more or less liberal, and the left was also more or less socialist. There was room to build a democracy open to advocates of equality. Out of fear of the Soviet Union, the economic and financial sectors, both French and European and North American, accepted social compromises in exchange for European and Atlantic integration led by the United States. The end of the USSR changed the context, not only internationally, but also in terms of social compromises.
The governance built upon the ruins of the previous system, with its left- and right-wing ideologies and left- and right-wing parties, is personalistic. It promotes direct contact between the people and their leader. This is the model of Macronism in France, which offered the people a sham debate, called a "National Consultation," with boundaries set by the Head of State and prohibited questions (such as the abolition of the wealth tax). Even more problematic is the co-opting of this model by the new dissenting movement that emerged from the left and advocates for the construction of a populism embodied by a "leader," a self-proclaimed defender of the "people" oppressed by the elites.
This moment began to be ideologized as the end of history . But for whom? Perhaps we should debate the theories, especially on the left, that prioritize attacking the secession of the elites, promoting "left-wing populism." We should also question this moment that saw left-wing and right-wing liberals converge, socially and culturally marginalizing the former middle and lower-middle classes.
Discourses emerged demonizing and associating democratic socialism with communism to delegitimize the option of social commitments. The pursuit of individualized well-being, prioritizing societal aspirations, was massively disseminated by the communication industries and amplified by the rise of the digital economy. Minority cultures were prioritized, while social demands were dismissed. Same-sex marriage, the fight against gender violence, the defense of animal rights, and all forms of diversity intersected with the mass dissemination of individual forms of entertainment—Netflix, Facebook, news—a continuous spectacle on specialized channels. These captured an ever-increasing portion of everyone's available time.
Alongside these privileged societal compensations, insofar as they did not affect the hierarchies of social and labor relations, Pentecostal religious offerings appeared, based on a prosperity theology compatible with liberal economics. Also emerging were scapegoats, nationalists, or xenophobes who offered an "other" as responsible for the decline in living standards (Jews; Arabs; Latin American migrants; immigrants; homosexuals, etc.).
+ The left's resignation . The discontent and frustrations generated among the working class by the evolution of institutions and the social context were not analyzed by progressive political parties and unions. Out of intellectual laziness and a thirst for power, they chose not to follow these developments.
They accepted without debate the concept of spectacle politics, narrative politics, and emotional market politics [29] . They forgot about the “we” [30] , about social and national solidarities, the founding element of their programs. European communism, destabilized by the failure of “real socialism,” defined itself as Eurocommunist, only to end up in irrelevance. The most representative case is that of the Italian Communist Party, which survives, greatly weakened, as the Democratic Party. And it continues to divide. The socialists—at best—theorized the abandonment of the social sphere, prioritizing the societal. They admitted, in the post-Cold War world, the impossibility of constructing any alternative consistent with their principles. The Englishman Tony Blair invented “the Third Way,” the German Gerhard Schröder “the New Centre,” and the Spaniard José Rodríguez Zapatero “republican socialism.” In 1992, François Mitterrand proposed replacing internationalism with Europeanism, paradoxically at a historical moment of reorientation of the European project towards a liberal and globalized model.
In their own way, the "Yellow Vests," like the Spanish Indignados and the Brazilian, Tunisian, and Turkish protesters, expressed the weariness of majorities who reject the economic, financial, and political logic of societies increasingly deaf to the demands of the most vulnerable and struggling middle classes. The intellectual, moral, and political abdication of party "elites" who seek to reduce their role to a mere change of faces without proposing genuine democratic alternatives leads to situations of collapse. These situations generate doubts about the future and about the possibility of a positive way out of the growing disconnect between the global financial and economic world and democracy.
This weariness reveals, according to Monique Chemilly-Gendreau, a new redrawing of social boundaries. “There are no longer rich countries on one side and poor countries on the other; real (social) boundaries cross/divide cities, neighborhoods, buildings within the same country. This is a consequence of globalized capitalism [31] .”
[1] TICPE is the administrative acronym for this tax (=Taxe intérieure de consommation sur les produits énergétiques).
[2] Nine people were killed when cars ran them over at the barricades erected by protesters. An elderly woman died in her home after being struck by a tear gas canister.
[3] Edwy Plenel, « La victoire des vaincus », Paris, La Découverte, 2019.
[4] See in this regard, Jérôme Fourquet, Sylvain Manternach, « Les « Gilets jaunes » : révélateur fluorescent des fractures françaises », Paris, FJJ, November 28, 2018
[5] With the 1,7% increase for them only of a tax called CSG (Generalized Social Contribution).
[6] For the first time, pensions were not revalued to compensate for inflation; they increased by 0,3% with an inflation rate of 1,7%.
[7] The APL (Personalized Housing Assistance).
[8] The ISF, Wealth Tax, and the progressivity of taxation paid on capital.
[9] Via a Competitiveness and Employment Tax Credit (CICE).
[10] The maximum tax rate went from 1995 to 2017 from 59,1% to 50,2% / Alternatives économiques, Christian Chevagneux, p29.
[11] Op cited note 4, p45.
[12] Recommended by a commission of experts in 2014. See Jean Pisani-Ferry, « Quelle France dans dix ans », Paris Fayard, 2014./and « Les territoires des nouvelles régions », Paris, FNAU, 2016.
[13] See Stéphane Lecler, Refonder the urban policy of our country, Le Monde, January 3, 2019, p18.
[14] For a critique of regional reform, see Philippe Dubourg, « La réforme territoriale », Orthez, Ed. Gascogne, 2015.
[15] See Serge Halimi « Quand tout remonte à la surface », Le Monde Diplomatique, January 2019.
[16] Housing prices in France have increased by 63% since 2000. But by 87% in the Paris Region, 145% in Paris, and 153% in Lyon. Alternatives économiques, January 2019, p12.
[17] See David de Ugarte, «11M, Networks to win a war», Barcelona, Icaria Mas Madera, 2004.
[18] See Jean Jacques Kourliandsky, “Spain, Brazil: les indignations évanescentes”, in « Mondialisation et contestation », Paris, RIS, N°93, spring 2014.
[19] 303 deputies out of 577.
[20] See Jean-Emmanuel Rey, « Gilets jaunes »: comment find un délégué?, Paris, Le Monde, December 20, 2018.
[21] See Marc Bassets, The "Yellow Vests" open the referendum debate, Madrid, El País, December 18, 2018, p4.
[22] In Christophe Guilluy, «Le crepuscule de la France d'en haut», Paris, Flammarion/Champs actuel, 2017, pp 182/183 and by the same author, "No Society", Paris, Flammarion, 2018.
[23] See Alexandre Poussart, A national assembly of three CSP+, Le Monde, June 19, 2017/and Maxime Ferrer, Trains de vie des députés, Le Monde, October 24, 2017.
[24] Reference to the book by Christopher Lasch.
[25] See François Cornut-Gentille, « A abaisser continuellement les institutions, le président se trouve face à la démocratie des ronds-points. Good courage » (By permanently weakening institutions, the president has to face the democracy of the roundabouts. Good luck!)) in Le Monde, December 20, 2018, p7.
[26] See Alexandre Lemarié, Pour siphonner LFI et RN, LRM rêve d'une liste « gilets jaunes », Le Monde, December 18, 2018 (LFI= La France insoumise/RN= Rassemblement nationa:/LRM= La République en marche).
[27] “This movement (…) is the perfect example of the process of disaffection and detachment of the popular classes,” Christophe Guilluy, The Yellow Vests, an effect of globalization, Madrid, El País, December 18, 2018, p15.
[28] Monique Chemilly-Gendreau, « Régression de la démocratie et déchaînement de la violence », Paris, textuel, 2019.
[29] See the analysis of the 2007 French presidential campaign, in Christian Salmon, «Storytelling, The machine for making stories and formatting minds», Península, Barcelona, 2008.
[30] See Mark Lilla, "The liberal return, beyond identity politics", Debate, 2018.
[31] Op. Cité p 98/99.
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