War, weapons, and equality between countries
By Esteban Torres1
Perhaps when we view a war from a broader perspective, the future ceases to be—at least in part—an enigma. In this endeavor, the author places us at an unavoidable crossroads: “We need to recognize that there will be no completely disarmed societies in the future of our civilizations. Therefore, the necessary discussion about how to build a new world order based on peace must consider this reality, which is destined to persist.” How can Latin America be included in this discussion, in a way that simultaneously considers the pursuit of development and equality in our societies? How can we reconcile the proposal of a multipolar world with the integration of peripheral countries into the global arms market? There are no easy answers, and the imperatives are necessarily regional. What is at stake is significant, as Esteban Torres reminds us: “It is the future of Latin America as a free and livable society for the majority of its people.”
This text aims to highlight an aspect that has been neglected in current analyses of the war in Ukraine. I am referring to the advancement of a process of differentiated militarization of national economies and historical societies as a whole. The fact that I'm shifting my focus to that aspect doesn't mean that this point of observation can offer a privileged key to understanding all the critical dimensions at play in the ongoing conflict, much less that it provides the necessary tools to try to predict the outcome of the dispute. I distance myself from such an all-encompassing purpose. However, what I am completely sure of is that the explanation of the dynamics of war, and, more generally, of the complex development of the different national spheres of world society, cannot do without the topic that I will address. To delve into the thorny problem of the expansive militarization of world society, I will take an alarming fact as an indicator. All available sources of information agree in highlighting that, as a result of the current war in Ukraine, there is a clear trend towards an increase in the budget that States allocate to the arms sector. So far, it is a movement involving the wealthy West and the eastern sphere of the world, which predates this war, but is magnified and accelerated by it. These days most analysts prefer to talk about the uniform activation of an arms race that compromises the fate of humanity (Chomsky, in Polychroniou, 2022; Egeland, 2022). However, while acknowledging the existence of a common underlying problem, we must not lose sight of the differential impacts that this global degradation phenomenon is producing. Abstract data on the increase in state spending in the sector do not allow us to observe in concrete terms what type of operations each country allocates its resources to and how transactions between different states and leading companies in the global arms market actually unfold. Both aspects are crucial to detecting the full range of interests that accompany the transfer of weapons from one country to another in each war situation, and to understanding the consequences that this arms expansion process may bring to the evolution of each national sphere and, from there, to the planet as a whole. What is usually presented to the public as aid or military support to a particular country struggling to survive involves lucrative businesses based on the transfer of military equipment and weapons, as well as a set of heavy conditions that transcend the military sphere. This can be seen today by reviewing the ingredients that accompany the shipment of weapons to Ukraine by NATO countries, mainly the United States, and it could also be observed, some years ago, when Russia offered military support to Syria. The critical aspect of the matter is that arms purchases, particularly by poor countries, tend to increase their economic and political dependence on the main arms-selling countries that are involved in war. This process of subjugation, in addition to eroding the sovereignty of subordinate countries, tends to deepen inequalities between classes of societies in the world.
In a previous work on the war in Ukraine, I focused on characterizing the economies of the countries involved based on the weight of the military industry in their respective national economic structures. This way of observing the internal economic matrix of the countries allowed me to distinguish, following Max Weber, between war economies and peace economies (Torres, 2022a). The former have a structural propensity for military activity. Here, however, I concentrate on the international level to characterize the countries based on their type of integration into the global arms market. The central difference between the two approaches lies in the fact that a country in which the production and export of weapons prevails, to the detriment of imports, does not necessarily constitute a war economy.
Who produces and who consumes?
The escalation of a war situation activates the arms market, which in turn drives two distinct economic functions for countries, and more precisely, for states. These functions are defined by each nation's position within this market. I am referring to arms-producing countries (APCs) and arms-consuming countries (ACCs). APCs are those that allocate their state budgets to strengthen their arms industry and steer the sector toward selling weapons technology, while ACCs spend their resources on acquiring weapons from other countries. Thus, the former are export-oriented, while the latter are structurally defined by their import function. A country becomes an APC when its trade balance shows a greater income from arms exports than the foreign currency expenditure generated by importing these weapons technologies. The opposite is true for arms-consuming countries: ACCs are those that import more than they export.
A law of global power is that the more central a country is, the greater its arms-producing capacity. Throughout history, it has been observed that dominant countries were or became arms-producing powers, while peripheral countries were relegated to the role of consumers. One doesn't need to be an expert in the history of warfare to recognize that the great powers of recent centuries have been the main arms producers of their time. Since the 15th century, this has been successively the case for Spain, England, the United States, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Spain and England gained decisive advantages from their naval power, while the United States and the USSR, engaged in fierce competition until the 1990s, managed to lead the aerospace industry and become the leading nuclear powers of the 20th century. Looking ahead, there is a high probability that China will become a dominant arms-producing power in the coming decades.
The historical behavior of world powers, as dominant powers, is more similar than we might imagine. All those countries that achieved imperial status opted to sell weapons to their colonies, to countries within their sphere of influence, and to their allies, establishing military superiority and economic supremacy in the sector through these exchanges. From this observation emerges a second law of power: no producing country transfers the capacity to produce those latest-generation or most destructive weapons that could jeopardize its military and commercial supremacy. Even now, when private arms companies in core countries are growing rapidly, allowing them to circumvent many of their respective state controls, their most sensitive sales are still monitored by those states. As we all know, since the 20th century, this policy of extreme reserves by dominant countries has focused on nuclear weapons. The nuclear non-proliferation treaties that began to be signed in the 1960s sought to prevent, among other things, the global democratization of the production of this crucial military technology. Furthermore, from the buyer's perspective, by acquiring weapons, a country not only recognizes the military supremacy of the seller but also agrees—based on more or less imposed rules—not to immediately use the acquired weapons against that seller. This basic principle is usually strictly adhered to, as the possibility of using and maintaining the acquired weapons technology becomes inextricably linked to the provision of a range of services—supplies, spare parts, and technical expertise—by the relevant power. The persistent nature of this type of commercial relationship is particularly evident in the purchase and sale of heavy weaponry.
To further analyze this phenomenon, I suggest we take a look at the graph presented. It shows the main arms-producing (exporting) and consuming (importing) countries in the world, how these two categories have been positioned over the last decade, and how the major producers and consumers are interconnected.
Source: SIPRI.
According to data processed by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the United States remains the world's largest arms exporter, accounting for 38,6% of total international sales between 2017 and 2021. Russia follows at a considerable distance, with 18.4% of the market share. As can be seen, the list of exporting countries includes the major European powers, and all the listed countries are highly developed. Not a single Latin American or African country appears on the list of major producers.
Nor are they among the main buyers. Although all Latin American countries are classified as LCPs (Living Progressive Countries), between 2017 and 2021 their arms imports were lower than in any other five-year period in the last half-century (SIPRI, 2022). It is important to note that there is also no direct correlation between the size of the main national economies and their position as arms-exporting countries. For example, Russia is the world's second-largest arms exporter and Germany the fifth, the latter with a market share of less than a quarter of the former (4,5% vs. 18.6%), even though the German economy has a GDP three times larger than Russia's (€3.570.620 million vs. €1.501.006 million) (Macro Data, 2022). This is explained by the fact that Russia is a war economy, while Germany, despite being a LCP, remains a peacetime economy (Torres, 2022a). The case of the People's Republic of China deserves special mention. Currently, the Asian giant is a powerful economic center (PAC) with advanced production functions and the potential to become a powerful arms producer (PA). However, the path to this economic transformation is neither linear nor guaranteed. As shown in the table, its exports contracted in the 2017-2021 period compared to the previous period (2012-2016), while its imports barely increased in percentage terms. This presents an atypical situation, destined to change in the medium term: despite not being a PA, China ranks fourth in the world among arms-exporting countries, while, as a powerful economic center, it is the fifth largest arms importer globally.
The chart also shows that the main PCAs are located in the Middle East: India and Saudi Arabia are the world's leading buyers (both accounting for 11% of total purchase volume), followed at a considerable distance by Egypt and Australia (5,7% and 5.4%, respectively). Russia is the main supplier to India and Egypt, while the US is the main supplier to Saudi Arabia and Australia. In the case of the US trade relationship with these countries, a complementary articulation can be observed between an industrial capitalism and two commodity-based capitalisms. I characterize the economies of Saudi Arabia and Australia as commodity-based capitalisms because they are dependent on raw materials (Torres, 2020; 2022a). Saudi Arabia is the world's leading oil exporter and the number one supplier to the United States (Rundel, 2020), while Australia exports a wide range of raw materials, primarily gold and other precious metals, which account for approximately 35% of its exports (Icontainers, 2020). Unlike India and Egypt, which are large, populous, and impoverished countries, Saudi Arabia and Australia are high-income, relatively small in population, and are developing as thriving commodity-based economies in the shadow of Western powers, without playing a significant role in global power struggles.
Latin America, power relations and the dilemma of the search for equality
All societies have had, have, and will have weapons in the future. Some used and still use them to defend themselves, others to attack, and the rest for both. In the universe of sociology, it was Norbert Elias who took it upon himself to highlight the dynamics that set in motion these aggressive inclinations, based on defining historical communities as units of attack and defense (Elias, 2014). I would like to be emphatic on this point because we need to recognize that there will be no absolutely unarmed societies in the future of our civilizations. Therefore, the necessary discussion on how to build a new world order based on peace today must take into account this reality that is destined to persist. It should be added that since the 18th century, virtually no country has managed to escape a subordinate position in world society without transforming its economy into an industrial capitalism, and then, more specifically, without managing to transition from a consumer country to a producer of armaments. The history of the effective self-determination of countries has gone hand in hand with a more or less successful process of producing military technology. This statement, which is bitter for those of us who strive for world peace, does not refer to a personal opinion but to an objective process. And another extremely sensitive observation is that the sustained reduction of inequalities in positions between countries is often at odds with the pacification of world society. What has happened and is happening more frequently is that situations of increasing equality between core and peripheral countries magnify competition between them, instead of generating as a first reaction a new situation of recognition and peaceful coexistence. And countries wage this decisive competition in a ruthless way, resorting to all socially available means, with the universe of military forces being a central area in shaping the scenario of international disputes. On that occasion when two leading countries found themselves in a situation of relative parity, as happened with the United States and the USSR in the second half of the 20th century, the greatest arms race in the history of humanity was generated. From this we can intuit that the laborious advent of a "multipolar world", which the marginalized countries of the world have always wanted to achieve, will not necessarily bring with it increasing global peace. As an example, it was by no means accidental that as the processes of regional integration from below advanced in Latin America in the period 2003-2015, the need to design an interstate defense device to safeguard the progress of independence on the continent grew. At the First Conference of Defense Ministers of the South American Community of Nations, held in Bogotá on July 14, 2006, the need to "promote in the region mechanisms that, based on the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, facilitate cooperation to fight more effectively against the threats to the defense and security of South America" was publicly and explicitly stated (Morales Ruvalcaba, 2011: 9). This integrationist project was reduced to ashes as the first Latin American progressive wave of the 21st century weakened and then became deactivated.
For a government of a peripheral country aspiring to preserve, regain, or achieve its independence, the question of how to engage with the arms market becomes an extremely thorny issue. The topic has practically become taboo, as it pushes to its most critical point the imperative of industrialization for subordinate countries—including all the countries of Latin America—as a means of overcoming their peripheral status in global society. And I emphasize that it pushes it to its most critical point because what must be decided as a government and as a nation is the extent to which we are prepared to develop a critical industry, one that not only fails to contribute to environmental protection but also increases the country's effective or potential aggression. Faced with this dilemma, what we are certain of is that it is impossible to advance a state strategy for protecting those peripheral societies and regions undergoing global rise without a defensive force capable of deterring any attempt at external military interference or interference persistently instigated from abroad.
Unfortunately, what is being decided today in the Western and Eastern spheres of the planet, with an identical progression for the short and medium term, is not precisely the disarmament of countries. Rather, states are fighting among themselves to determine who will be able to produce decisive weaponry, and which countries will gain decisive military advantages in relation to their immediate competitors and other national actors. This dispute, with its extremely high political and economic impact, is part of the less visible backdrop of the current war in Ukraine. As has been happening for centuries, those who manage to lead the market for the production of military technology will see their ability to dictate the rules of operation for other societies increase. The weight that the technological culture of nations acquires was perfectly understood by Darcy Ribeiro half a century ago, when he warned us—at a time of regional political regrouping—about the degree of technological backwardness in Latin America (Ribeiro, 1968). Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the fact that military technology is increasing its capacity for social destruction. This is undoubtedly a dramatic global event, insofar as it places all of humanity on the brink of the abyss. The tragedy of the current wars, with their epicenter in Ukraine, brings to the forefront an old dilemma for Latin America: to cease being the eternal losers of world history and to finally achieve a position of equality among nations, we must not only activate and then synchronize our internal national development policies on a regional level, but also prevent by all means the proliferation of external interference and belligerence aimed at sabotaging our modest sovereign gains. What is at stake is the future of Latin America as a free and livable society for the majority of its people.
Bibliography
Macroeconomic data (2022). Compare countries' economies: Germany vs. Russia. URL: https://datosmacro.expansion.com/paises/comparar/alemania/rusia
Elias, N. (2014). The civilizing process. Sociogenetic and psychogenetic research. Mexico City: FCE.
Egeland, J. (2022). We Need Negotiations, Not an Arms Race, to End War in Ukraine & Prevent a New Cold War, Democracy Now02/06/2022. URL: https://www.democracynow.org/2022/5/2/jan_egeland_civilian_suffering_ukraine
Morales Ruvalcaba, D. (2011). South American Defense Council: a catalytic mechanism in the regional integration of South America. Latin American Contextualizations Journal, 5(3), 1-16. https://doi.org/10.32870/cl.v0i5.2841
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] (2022). SIPRI Year Book 2022. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. UK: Oxford University Press.
Icontainer (2020). What are Australia's Main Imports and Exports? Icontainer, Url: https://www.icontainers.com/es/2020/01/15/principales-exportaciones-importaciones-australia/
Polychroniou, CJ (2022). Noam Chomsky: The US does not want a diplomatic solution in Ukraine and opens the door to nuclear war. Page 12, 17/05/2022 https://www.pagina12.com.ar/422202-noam-chomsky-ee-uu-no-quiere-una-salida-diplomatica-en-ucran
Ribeiro, D. (1969). The civil process. Stages of sociocultural evolution. Caracas: Library Editions.
Rundell, David (2020). Vision or Mirage: Saudi Arabia at the Crossroads. London: IB Tauris
Torres, Esteban (2020). The inter-capital system: towards an expanded globalization of the capitalist economy, Encounters. Journal of Social Sciences, 18, 3, 12-23. https://doi.org/10.15665/encuent.v18i3.2331
Torres, Esteban (2022a). How to stop the war?, Amphibia Magazine18/03/2022. URL: https://www.revistaanfibia.com/como-parar-la-guerra/Torres, Esteban (2022b). The Intercapital System: Molecular and Organic Classes, Global Dialogue, 12, 2, International Sociological Association (ISA) https://globaldialogue.isa-sociology.org/articles/the-intercapital-system-molecular-and-organic-classes
1Professor of Sociology, Researcher at CONICET and Director of the “Global Social Change” Program
at the Center for Research and Studies on Culture and Society (CIECS), Faculty of Sciences
Social Sciences, UNC. Co-coordinator of the CLACSO Working Group on Social Theory and Latin American Reality.
This article was originally published in: https://cdc.sociales.unc.edu.ar/la-guerra-las-armas-y-la-igualdad-entre-paises/
If you would like to receive more information about CLACSO's training programs:
[widget id=”custom_html-57″]
to our email lists.
