Hegemony, electoral power and symbolic dispute in Honduras

Prepared by Galel Briceño
Specialist in Economic and Social Studies,
in the Secretariat of Strategic Planning
Member of the Honduran Association of Sociology, AHS-UNAH
The 2025 Honduran elections are taking place in a context where the outcome is not only determined at the ballot box, but also through the strategic control of electoral institutions. Giovanni Sartori warned that “democracy is a regime in which parties lose elections” (Sartori, 2005, p. 22). But in contexts of low public trust, the problem is not only who loses, but who has the institutional capacity to certify the defeat. In Honduras, the dispute is not only about votes, but also about who counts, validates, narrates, and transfers those votes.
The Honduran electoral system includes the National Electoral Council (CNE), the Electoral Court of Justice (TJE), the National Registry of Persons (RNP), the Clean Politics Unit, the Attorney General's Office, and the Superior Court of Accounts. These institutions certify the voter registry, campaign financing, the transmission of results, and the final validity of the process. However, as Pierre Bourdieu warned, “symbolic power is a power of constructing reality” (Bourdieu, 1997, p. 170); therefore, controlling the institution means controlling the legitimate version of the election results. In Marxist terms, the political struggle is not only a struggle for state power, but also for control of the apparatuses that produce the official truth.
The approval of the Permanent Board in Congress is a mechanism that alters internal legislative processes. According to Sartori, “whoever controls the procedure, controls the possible outcome” (Sartori, 1994, p. 66). This transforms Congress into an electoral actor, even when not actively campaigning and despite lacking authority within the electoral system, because it can modify the symbolic and political balance of power in the process. Thus, in the electoral contest, the opposition falsely claims that the Permanent Board could wield power over the National Electoral Council (CNE).
Added to this is the crisis within the National Electoral Council (CNE). The lack of agreement on the awarding of the Preliminary Electoral Results Transmission (TREP) system is fueling public distrust, stemming from the conspiracy denounced by the CNE secretary, Marlon Ochoa. Anthony Downs argued that “citizens accept the results only if they believe the process was fair” (Downs, 1957, p. 103). If the electoral authority is perceived as divided, even a clean election can be interpreted as fraud by some sectors. Therefore, speeches like that of Salvador Nasralla, who anticipates that the elections will be “stolen” from him, are not just rhetoric: they are a narrative strategy to deny unfavorable results.
The religious-political component also emerges. The ordinary session held by conservative members of parliament at the Abundant Life Church is more than a mere formality: it is a symbolic regrouping of the right wing. Bourdieu wrote that “symbolic capital is the legitimate authority exercised over minds” (Bourdieu, 1997, p. 119). Taking Congress to a church is to transfer political power to the space where the right wing maintains its moral and emotional base. It is an attempt to challenge hegemony by appealing to faith when popular mobilization is lacking.
However, the balance of power is not merely institutional or symbolic. Unlike previous processes, Libre has consolidated an organic relationship with popular sectors, unions, neighborhood movements, and community organizations. This social base perceives the government's management as a break—albeit an incomplete one—with the previous hegemony, expressed through subsidies, social programs, and political recognition of the historically excluded. In Gramscian terms, Libre not only administers the state but also builds hegemony from below, because the people cease to be spectators and act as political subjects.
The ongoing mobilization in Tegucigalpa embodies this popular hegemony: it transforms the streets into a material force. It is not merely a symbolic gathering, but a real capacity for exerting pressure. When the people occupy public space, they raise the political cost of any attempt to disregard the results. The streets function as a defense mechanism for the vote, as a collective guarantee against class-based structures that have historically made decisions from above. This compels a rethinking of electoral scenarios.
Prospected scenarios
Scenario 1: Popular hegemony and legitimacy from the street.
Libre capitalizes on territorial mobilization as organized social power. The core vote and the urban periphery are activated, participation expands, and legitimacy is also built in the streets. Hegemony is not only electoral: it is social.
Scenario 2: Symbolic hegemony of the opposition, but without a material basis.
The right wing relies on churches, NGOs, media, and social networks to contest the narrative, but lacks the capacity for counter-mobilization. It can erode public opinion, but it cannot occupy the streets. In Marxist terms, this is ideological domination without organic force.
Scenario 3: “Catastrophic stalemate” and judicialization of the conflict.
If the opposition refuses to accept the results and the National Electoral Council (CNE) remains divided, the process could be challenged in the Electoral Tribunal (TJE). If both sides mobilize their supporters, the dispute will cease to be institutional and will become a social conflict, risking a crisis of governance. As Poulantzas warned, when two forces are unable to prevail over each other, the state enters a structural crisis. The open support of the US Embassy for the opposition, the conspiracy, and the strategies similar to those employed in Venezuela must also be considered.
Final, but not conclusive, reflection
The Honduran election will not only decide who wins votes, but who manages to establish a legitimate interpretation of what happened. And in a country where power has always been contested between institutions and the people, popular mobilization could be the deciding factor.
Highlighted
Bourdieu, P. (1997). Practical Reasons. On the Theory of Action. Anagrama.
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Row.
Sartori, G. (1994). Comparative Constitutional Engineering. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Sartori, G. (2005). Parties and party systems. Alianza Editorial.
Poulantzas, N. (1978). State, Power, Socialism. Verse.
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. International Publishers.