Over the past fifteen years, in ballot boxes and on the streets of Europe and the Americas, we have witnessed the rise of the far right and the erosion of democratic systems. We have seen right-wing political movements become more sophisticated in their strategies for expanding and consolidating their electoral bases, experimenting with forms of popular legitimacy even when promoting programs that undermine the interests of the majority. Consequently, we observe a broad mobilization of young people, women, and workers—both formal and informal—in support of right-wing political agendas, a phenomenon that demands comparative structural analyses of gender, class, and generation to better understand its expansion.

Globally, a shift in eras is evident, showing signs of acceleration following the COVID-19 pandemic. This shift is characterized by the war between Russia and Ukraine and the invasion of Palestine, the ongoing climate crisis, the technological revolution that tends to displace human labor from the production system, and the lack of political initiatives to generate quality employment with decent wages. This scenario translates into serious social conflicts and a crisis of political representation that threatens already weakened democracies.

Likewise, the challenges to the patriarchal system brought about by fourth-wave feminism and the struggles for gender and sexual diversity have challenged traditional gender and family roles, and have placed the demand for bodily autonomy on the public agenda. Within this repertoire of sociocultural transformations lies the proliferation of anti-rights movements, a key base for the radical right, whose moral foundation has acquired political nuances capable of appealing to popular sectors that demand more order and security, as well as amnesties and protections for leaders involved in attempts at institutional subversion, as evidenced by the Brazilian case.

Furthermore, political and partisan disputes are shaped by the communications revolution and the influence of social media, mass media, and political influencers—a space where the production and reproduction of hate speech and contempt for political adversaries is quick and easy (Stefanoni 2021). This environment facilitates the consolidation of new political leaders who advocate disruptive, conservative, and violent rhetoric (Ahmed 2015). This contributes to a crisis of legitimacy in politics and a widespread distrust of representative democracy.

In Latin America, the initial events—the overthrow of Manuel Zelaya in Honduras (2009), the impeachment of Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (2012), the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff (2016), and the politicization of the judiciary that culminated in the arrest of Lula da Silva (2018)—foreshadowed the strengthening of alliances between right-wing political forces, powerful vested interests, and lawfare. However, recent electoral victories in various regions demonstrate that contemporary right-wing movements not only thrive on structural inequalities but also aim to win the “cultural battle” and construct new forms of “hegemony” (see Laje and Marquez, 2022; Semán et al., 2023). In other words, this process has evolved in the region toward increasingly radicalized political options in conjunction with mobilized groups that adopt repertoires of direct action.

The limitations of the reformist agenda of the "pink tide" governments became evident in the rightward shift at the polls: Mario Abdo, Jair Bolsonaro, Mauricio Macri, Sebastián Piñera, Iván Duque, and Nayib Bukele. All of them represented right-wing movements with a popular base. Furthermore, in Bolsonaro's Brazil, the militarization of the state deepened, hate speech was legitimized, and episodes of political violence intensified, including the assassination of supporters of Lula da Silva. Although Lula da Silva's return to the presidency brought several initiatives to contain Bolsonaro's influence, highly punitive state dynamics persist, as evidenced by the massacre perpetrated by the Rio de Janeiro Military Police in October 2025 during "Operation Containment," under the administration of Governor Cláudio Castro of the Liberal Party, which—paradoxically—brought him even more popularity. In Mexico, although progressive governments with weak right-wing opposition have been established since 2018, developmentalist policies have clashed with social movements (feminist and environmental) and have reverted to a historical presidential system that relies heavily on the armed forces for support. Meanwhile, the electoral landscape in Honduras, Colombia, and Chile points to the return of governments with regressive and repressive agendas. All of this suggests that Latin America is entering a new historical phase, novel in several respects (Bolcatto and Souroujon 2020), notably marked by a growing social tolerance of authoritarianism.

What innovative aspects do these radical right-wing movements present? What is new about these right-wing movements that has managed to defeat, displace, or corner the governments of the "pink tide" of the early 21st century? These questions guide the agenda of the Working Group, active since 2016, which seeks to understand the ideological and identity-based appeal of right-wing and far-right coalitions and parties, as well as to draw comparisons with other relevant historical experiences. The Working Group aims to rigorously study these contemporary right-wing movements, promote situated research, and employ comparative approaches that allow for the identification of their specific characteristics and the ways in which they challenge, strain, and reshape party politics and democratic life.

We highlight three aspects that we consider key for this new stage of the Working Group. First, the emergence of revisionist expressions regarding the recent past, whose main exponents—Jair Bolsonaro and Javier Milei—relatize or minimize human rights violations, deny their gravity, and, in some cases, posit that they were compensated for by supposed economic or social achievements. This phenomenon compels us to more precisely examine the public policies implemented by authoritarian regimes, distinguishing between their historical functioning and the partisan narratives that retrospectively idealize them (Da Silva Catela, 2010). The recurrence of these narratives has intensified in the context of significant anniversaries. of various dictatorships – Chile and Uruguay in 2013, Guatemala and Paraguay in 2014, Brazil in 2014 and Argentina in 2016 and 2026 (Soler et al 2014) – reinforcing the need for a critical analysis that illuminates the ideological component of these reinterpretations.

The second aspect is the motivation that radical right-wing movements arouse among young people, women, and informal workers, whose antecedents can be traced back to opposition mobilizations against progressive governments, such as those seen against the administrations of Cristina Fernández and Dilma Rousseff. These public expressions, with repertoires reminiscent of the pot-banging protests and marches against the Popular Unity government in Chile (Power 2008; Palieraki 2000, 2001), allow us to examine how certain social sectors—traditionally associated with democratizing agendas—are now integrating into right-wing coalitions, reconfiguring the meanings of protest and broadening the social base of these forces.

And thirdly, it is important to reinforce the socialization of accumulated and new knowledge about the phenomenon in question, especially among political actors of different kinds (progressive parties, unions, social movements) and teachers whose classroom experience is being impacted by the circulation among young people of discourses and attitudes clearly aligned with the agendas of the so-called "new right."

In Latin America, the rise of the far right reflects a political realignment that directly challenges the democracies of the Global South. These movements combine libertarian narratives, historical revisionism regarding dictatorships, intensive use of digital platforms, and territorial mobilization strategies that have successfully contested common sense, eroded various democratic consensuses, and positioned themselves as "anti-system" alternatives. At the same time, their political expansion within society stems from the weakness of progressive movements in offering stable and lasting future alternatives, the widening of inequalities, and the growing influence of religious and media actors. In this context, the study of the right today is theoretically highly relevant, socially urgent, and intellectually necessary to understand its historical development, repertoires of action, and ideological adaptations.

However, historical studies on Latin America have paid more attention to the ideas and practices of the left than to those produced by members of the right, even though the latter held power for longer periods during the 20th century (McGee Deutsch 2005). Furthermore, the phenomenon of right-wing youth and self-identified feminists, who now have a massive presence in the public sphere, leads us to question the historicity of the specific forms of political participation of these actors. Currently, quite a lot is known about left-wing radicalized youth in the 1960s and 1970s (Gilman 2003; Langland 2004; Markarian 2001, 2011; Terán 1991; Zolov 1999) and about some sociability practices of current youth (Alvarado and Vommaro 2010; Bohoslavsky, et al 2019;), but much less has been researched about right-wing youth in the last third of the 20th century and the beginning of the 20th century (Bohoslavsky, et al 2018; Gondentul and Saferstein 2021). Similarly, women involved in organizations seeking to break with traditional gender roles have been more extensively studied (Andújar et al. 2009), while right-wing women have received less attention (Power 2008; Céspedes 2015; Martins Cordeiro 2008; Vázquez and Spataro 2025). Along the same lines, and contrary to the assumption of a homogeneous bloc, studies are needed on new patterns of behavior and right-wing alliances with local and transnational actors such as the Catholic Church (and other currently influential congregations, such as neo-Pentecostal groups), think tanks (Ramírez 2007; Giménez 2024), the World Anti-Communist League, the John Birch Society, and intellectual circles concentrated in journals and conferences.

In this context, the Working Group seeks to contribute to a rapidly expanding historiographical field: the study of South American and Caribbean dictatorships and the right-wing movements that promoted or sustained them (Broquetas, 2024). This field has allowed for a rethinking of central problems such as the production of consensus in authoritarian regimes, the multiple scales of state repression, public policies—especially social and cultural ones—the memories and uses of the dictatorial past, the impacts on the world of work, political organizations and social movements, as well as the transformations in everyday life, etc. (Fico 1997, 2004, 2008; Tcach 2006; Ansaldi 2004; Corradi 1992; Marchesi 2004; Panizza 1990; Reis, et al. 2004; Rico 1995; Rostica 2014; Valdivia 2009, 2012; Valdivia et al. 2006, 2012). Integrating these debates allows for a more precise understanding of the historicity, renewals, and contemporary impacts of the Latin American right.

On the other hand, a growing academic interest can be observed in new forms of the right, in their combination with populism, neoliberalism, and their close ties to the US Republican Party lobby (Bolcatto and Souroujon 2020), as well as in government or opposition to the "turn to the left" of the early 20th century (Domínguez et al., 2011; Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014; Morresi 2008). Partly due to the electoral strength of some European right-wing parties, as well as the resurgence of far-right movements with strong levels of social support in Germany and France, and even due to the almost complete abandonment of principles by partisan left-wing parties in favor of neoliberal political economy and security fundamentalism, the fact remains that current and past right-wing movements continue to be an object of political, civic, and academic interest (Mudde, 2007).

Along these lines, since 2016, our Working Group has been developing a research agenda—integrating recent history, political sociology, youth studies, gender, and political cultures—that allows us to understand these processes in a situated way, beyond imported categories. This Working Group proposes a comparative analysis of the ideological appeals of these right-wing movements, their popular bases, their interventions in the struggle over memory, and their continuities with authoritarian experiences of the past.

This GT is based on the following notions:

a) The ideologically plural character of the right wing.

b) The relational character of the right: part of its identity and practices can only be understood as part of the dialogue and the struggle with other political traditions.

c) The historical character of right-wing movements: which accounts for their capacity to adapt to different contexts, modifying practices based on new diagnoses and social alliances. This allows for the identification of "new," "traditional," "radical," or "emerging" right-wing movements, etc.

Based on the above, this Working Group aims to continue six lines of work:

1. Democracies and the Right

2. Right-wing youth groups

3. Right-wing women

4. Transnational Circles and Networks

5. Right-wing Intellectuals and Social Sciences

6. Dictatorship and Public Policies

Based on the above, the questions guiding this project are: How can we explain the identification of young people and women with "right-wing pride" (Kaysel, 2015)? What political practices were employed by right-wing actors (electoral alliances, groupings, dissolutions, relationships with government bodies, the Church, and civil society actors)? What similarities do their current practices and discourses share with those of the Cold War? Which right-wing groups and figures were the most relevant in Latin America from the second half of the 60s to the present? What were the recurring topics, public discourses, and repertoires of action among right-wing groups? What kind of right-wing opposition did reformist impulses generate in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela? How were these resistances linked to previous right-wing traditions? How much of these expressions is new and how much is old? To what extent is there a "moralization of politics"? Are (De Lima 2015) and the "securitization" of the public agenda (Faganello 2015) the articulators of the new South American right?

This project seeks to engage in dialogue, discussion, and continue the work begun by Sandra McGee Deutsch (2005), José Luis Beired (1999), and Marcus Klein (2000) in comparing the Argentine, Chilean, and Brazilian right-wing movements in the first half of the 20th century, as well as to take advantage of the various compilations and books that contain references to authoritarianism and fascism in Latin America (Bertonha and Bohoslavsky 2016; Bertonha and Savarino 2013; Trindade 2000).

In summary, the GT seeks to produce critical, situated and comparative knowledge that contributes to explaining the specificity of these right-wing movements, their impact on democratic life and the challenges they pose for strengthening egalitarian agendas in the Global South.