This proposal seeks to deepen the discussion on the challenges facing Latin American democracies and their relationship to the phenomena of violence that characterize our region. We aim to contribute to the development of the theme "Democracies in Dispute: Horizons, Resistance, and the Construction of Alternatives from the Public and the Commons" of this new call for papers, focusing primarily on the ways in which democracies are intertwined with and affected/weakened by the phenomena of violence and authoritarianism that are now manifesting in increasingly complex ways. The purpose is to continue the research that has been underway for 25 years, since the creation of the Working Group "Violence and Society" within the framework of CLACSO (Briceño León, 2001). Many of the researchers who participated in that group are still involved today, dedicated to investigating violence and conflict, and highlighting important shifts that contribute to understanding the Latin American context.

Briceño-León, one of the group's founders, points out that violence is part of everyday life in Latin America, from the violence of conquest, slavery, independence, and the processes of land appropriation, expropriation of surplus, and state violence, including the military repression of the dictatorial governments of the Southern Cone and Central America (Briceño-León, 2001). The knowledge produced by the researchers in this group marks important changes in the dynamics of violence, which today constitute a distinct and overlapping process, referring to criminal and urban violence.

This study is framed by the 1970s and 1980s, a period when homicide rates increased exponentially in the region, particularly among young people. No other region in the world exhibits such high homicide rates, nor such a wide variety of types and forms of violence, including the proliferation of violent youth gangs, the prevalence of gender-based violence, and drug-related violence and money laundering, all of which are pressing issues today. These are compounded by more historical forms of violence such as persistent civil wars, guerrilla movements and death squads, state terrorism, dictatorships, social uprisings, and violent revolutions (Imbrush, Misse, Carrión, 2011).

Speaking of Latin America and the Caribbean today leads us to focus on the multiple forms of violence and the diverse forms of conflict that have taken on new dynamics and trajectories. The issue of criminal organizations and how they operate in illegal markets (Tenenbaum, 2022) is currently one of the main challenges to Latin American democracies and public security policies. These groups have expanded their operations and are present in capital cities and rural areas, prisons, slums, and border regions (Rodrigues, Feltran, and Zambon, 2023), establishing themselves as key actors in transnational criminal schemes that operate through networks (Dias and Paiva, 2022).

The expansion of the scope of these groups' activities has impacted several dimensions of social life, from the functioning of illegal markets, with the factionalization of criminal dynamics - what was previously considered common crime or deviance - (Rodrigues, Feltran and Zambon, 2023), to the impact on daily life, constituting an obstacle to the effectiveness of democracy.

The governance of criminal issues related to violence is central to both academic circles and the public agendas of state governments. Therefore, one of the most urgent reasons for addressing this topic is to examine the role of state governments in the interventions they implement to build mechanisms for preventing these types of violence. It is also crucial to reconstruct the network of actions and mediations carried out by various social, community, and neighborhood organizations to avoid, prevent, and reduce homicidal violence linked to drug trafficking. In recent years, the spread of violence (Dammert, Croci, and Frei, 2024; Giavedoni and Ginga, 2017; Binder, 2009) has become a problem deeply connected to the emergence and consolidation of illegal markets and the rise of different criminal groups that manage them, using violence to resolve their disputes.

This, coupled with the expansion of the contract killing industry and the increase in the number of people with substance use disorders—a phenomenon exacerbated by the effects of the pandemic—is leaving its mark on various sectors of society. Gender-based violence is manifested in the sustained increase in femicide rates (Fachinetto, 2025) and transfemicides, which has led to the development of statistical measurement tools, legal instruments, and specific public policies for its prevention, punishment, and eradication.

Thus, it is possible to identify how the phenomena of violence in its most varied manifestations have become more complex over time, but a dilemma persists—both in academic terms and in terms of social practices and public policies—regarding the relationship between violence and democracies in the Latin American context. The expectation that democratic contexts would bring about a decrease in violence did not materialize, and in practice, there was an increase and diversification of violence (Peralva, 1997; Neto, 2011). The relationship between violence and democracy is also evident in the very use of the democratic process to advance authoritarian policies through the dissemination of fear and the expansion of tactics such as the use of the term "narcoterrorism," which legitimizes violent and repressive interventions, even as justification for the interference of external agendas in the national policies of Latin American countries.

This shifts the debate from simply discussing models of democracy to focusing on models for confronting different forms of violence and crime. Center-left governments implemented inclusive social policies and international policy strategies oriented towards multilateralism, but in the area of ​​social control, they emphasized—even while claiming to combat them—punitive policies based on a repressive police force, an opaque and penalizing judicial system, and increased incarceration (Tavares dos Santos, Barreira, 2016).

In addition to the above, these policies have intensified through the Bukele Model in El Salvador and police operations in Brazil, guided by a strategy of exterminating the enemy. These policies have had little impact on reducing violence and dismantling organized crime, yet they enjoy a degree of social and political legitimacy. Given this scenario of increasingly complex forms and dynamics of violence (Venegas Álvarez, 2025), as well as the disputes surrounding models for addressing these phenomena, in which strictly repressive measures, marked by penal populism, gain social legitimacy, we consider it essential in this new work proposal to revisit the debate on the role of the State in public security policies, guided by the guarantee of due process, respect for dignity, and human rights. It is crucial that academia, social movements, and state officials assume a leading role in proposing more qualified and effective responses to crime and violence, where public security policies must be guided by democratic values ​​and principles.

Most of the scientific literature specializing in criminology agrees that Latin America is the most violent region in the world. This situation severely undermines democratic processes and state capacities while simultaneously fostering the development of powerful illegal activities (Dammert, 2025). Violence is linked to the consolidation and diversification of illegal markets throughout the region. What 40 or 50 years ago was concentrated on the trafficking of illegal drugs—particularly cocaine—has now expanded into a wide range of illicit economies, including the production and trafficking of various drugs, human trafficking, firearms trafficking, environmental crimes, diverse contraband markets, as well as criminal services such as extortion and kidnapping, and financial and corruption crimes—especially money laundering and the capture of public institutions—through which the proceeds of these activities are channeled and protected.

Criminal organizations are exhibiting increasingly prosperous and fluid connections among themselves (Trejo and Ley, 2021; Auyero and Sobering, 2021), acquiring a regional and transnational scale. The interconnection between these organizations and certain political and economic elites (Florez Peres, 2009; Snyder and Durán Martínez, 2009; Sain, 2023) allows these illegal markets to become fluid and consistent. The membrane that interconnects these complex social and economic phenomena is the increasing levels of corruption that call into question democracy itself as a system of government in our countries.

In this context, a new repertoire of social control has emerged in recent decades, marked by political redefinitions and sophisticated security mechanisms. The term "security governance" is used to describe how public and private actors jointly shape the management of order (Bergman, 2023). Mechanisms such as gated communities, mass surveillance (cameras, facial recognition), monitoring systems, and police big data are proliferating. These devices tend to privatize security and restrict public space, establishing a "grammar of social control" centered on the "subject at risk," replacing the "citizen with rights," and identifying certain groups (migrants, poor youth, minorities) as "dangerous others" and potential threats (Wacquant, 2007 and 2023). This technocratic language disguises repressive measures as quick fixes: "wars on" crime or drugs are promoted, along with hardline slogans to persuade a fearful citizenry that "order will be restored." immediately (Durán Martínez, 2022). Under this logic, the social (welfare) state retreats while an authoritarian process of penal state advances, promising order through punishment, surveillance, and the normalization of exceptions.

The above can be seen as an authoritarian drift, referring to the tendency to use security as the central focus of discourses and policies that undermine democratic guarantees. In many countries, the political and electoral agenda has shifted toward promises of a hardline approach and extreme securitization. Hardliners argue that an "excessive guarantee" fuels impunity, justifying extraordinary measures outside the bounds of normal legality. This translates into prolonged states of emergency, militarization of public security, and punitive legal reforms. Simultaneously, on the conceptual and criminological level, a shift toward what Garland (2005, 2007) termed "criminologies of the other" is observed. Penal institutions are gaining ground while social policies are receding. Feeley and Simon (1992) propose an approach based on actuarial rationality, which manages risks rather than guaranteeing rights. In practice, this is evidenced by harsher penalties, increased prison populations, and indifference towards reintegration.

In analyzing the transition processes from authoritarian regimes to democracies in the late 1980s, Pinheiro (1991) identified structural resistance within civil society that operates independently of the political regime and constitutes an authoritarian continuity based on systems of social hierarchy that are regularly reproduced with the support of instruments of oppression and criminalization. The author calls this “socially implanted authoritarianism,” which precedes and surpasses authoritarian political regimes. This concept is fundamental to understanding not only the persistence of arbitrary practices and torture by the state, but also the ways in which civil society itself supports and legitimizes these actions today, more than 40 years after the end of dictatorial regimes. We understand that this notion contributes to our understanding of some of the challenges that arise in the effective consolidation of a democratic culture (Alvarado Mendoza et al, 2024) in the current Latin American context, and that it deserves to be expanded, reviewed and deepened (Alvarez et al, 2021) in the face of the new forms of authoritarianism that are expressed in the most varied forms of social and state violence and constitute an obstacle for democracies in Latin America.

Faced with these trends, the imperative arises to build democratic citizen security policies. Achieving security with democracy requires shifting the focus from punishment to social protection, reducing the role of the penal system and strengthening the welfare state—through education, health, and economic opportunities—as the first line of defense against crime. Without addressing the structural causes of violence, such as inequality and exclusion, hardline policies only manage to contain the problem temporarily.

Central America will be a central focus of the Working Group, both due to the spread of authoritarian models and the existing interest of its members. It is proposed to coordinate work with the Working Group on "Violence in Central America" ​​through the "Deciphering Central America: Violence, Authoritarianism, and Resistance" conferences, with annual virtual meetings, leveraging ongoing research on violence, security policies, and authoritarianism (including the Bukele-MS13 case). Simultaneously, collaboration will be fostered with the Working Group on "The State as Contradiction" through annual virtual meetings on "Violence, Security, and the State," to discuss public policies, the links between the State and organized crime, repressive strategies, and policies to prevent femicide, violence against young people, and violence against trans women. In a regional context adverse to democratic citizen security, the Working Group aims to strengthen the inclusive dimensions of the State and challenge socially legitimized, yet authoritarian, security practices.

Therefore, our overall objective is to contribute to strengthening lines of knowledge on violence, authoritarianism, and democratic security policies through a dialogue of knowledge among academia, state institutions, and social groups that influence the multi-agency design of public policies and interventions in the field of citizen security and the genuine strengthening of democratic regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Working Group's consolidation strategy envisions the planned incorporation of young researchers from priority countries with academic backgrounds, ties to the state and social movements, and the creation of three facilitation roles (academic, funding, and communication/dissemination) to energize the group. The facilitators will be three young researchers working in the three key areas mentioned for the Working Group's dynamic functioning.