The renewed focus on elites after decades of neglect is undoubtedly one of the major consequences of the financial crisis (2007–2009) (Korsnes et al. 2017; Piketty 2017). Elites, their control, and their disproportionate wealth and capacity for accumulation have been the subject of increasing public scrutiny by academics, international organizations, civil society, and non-governmental organizations (Best and Higley 2018; Bogliaccini and Luna 2016; Oxfam 2018). This heightened interest in elites has also been influenced by diverse research linking the top 1% (Dorling 2014), elite networks (Cárdenas 2020), and their perceptions (Krozer 2015; Reis and Moore 2005) to the maintenance and perpetuation of inequalities (Jelin, Motta, and Costa 2021).

Furthermore, Latin America is arguably the region where elites accumulate the most power, wealth, and influence. This expression of power is evident in high levels of inequality, the lack of progressivity in our tax systems, the high concentration of media ownership, and, more recently, the rise of businesspeople and CEOs to the presidency of several countries (Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, and Panama, for example). In this context, the study of elites emerges as a complex phenomenon requiring innovative analytical approaches that challenge, on the one hand, dehistoricized perspectives and, on the other, rigid conceptual frameworks. This Working Group aims to offer theoretical and methodological tools and perspectives for studying elites and their links to the state and inequality in Latin America, based on the analysis of specific sociohistorical processes from the recent past and present, all from comparative regional perspectives. We aim to provide insights into the diverse forms that political influence and domination have taken, and their relationship to economic and social transformations in different countries in recent decades. The Working Group's objective is to adopt a comparative analytical perspective that allows for innovative questions to be raised about a phenomenon that is not new to the region, but which has its own distinct characteristics in this century.

In Latin America, the concept of elites has been the subject of much discussion and, at times, has been conflated with other concepts such as oligarchies, power groups (Saxe Fernández 1999), or hegemonic blocs (Paniagua Serrano and Henríquez 2002). The diversity of these studies has emphasized the structural approach over the concept's actual operational aspects. Consequently, there is no consensus on its conceptualization, although there is agreement on its role in perpetuating the region's social and economic problems (Sanchez-Ancochea and Puig 2013).

In the literature in general, the operationalization of the concept has usually settled into two variants. First, the notion that defines elites by occupying formal positions of power. And second, those who consider elites according to the exercise of that power in making and influencing political decisions (Delamaza 2013). These two notions in the region have evolved into a more complex notion to operationalize, which includes not only their position but also their influence in politics, and sometimes also their control over resources (Durand 2010; Bull 2014).

In line with the above, our definition leans toward the second variant and understands elites as a group of people who hold privileged positions in powerful institutions (governments or large corporations) and who consequently exert disproportionate influence over political decisions (Rovira-Kaltwasser 2018). However, we do not consider elites to be a homogeneous bloc. Rather, due to the region's modernization, a series of fields and spheres have emerged with their specific structures, functions, and rules (Bühlmann, David, and Mach 2012). That is to say, we analyze and discuss with and about political elites—those who hold decision-making positions in the State (presidents, ministers, members of parliament) (Serna, Bottinelli 2018; Nercesián 2020)—and, above all, we discuss and analyze the role of economic elites—that is, the individuals who own and/or are partners in the main companies in each country.

In this regard, it is worth asking: What role do elites play in maintaining inequalities? When do elites become concerned with reducing poverty? Furthermore, historical debates about the domination and political influence of elites over the state have been revived, raising the question of what mechanisms and strategies they use to influence the state. What differences exist in terms of state capture across Latin America? The emergence of new media and the expansion of technological means of news dissemination have democratized access to information, but have they changed the structure and ownership of media elites? How are business elites and media elites related? In the demilitarization processes in some Latin American countries, what role do elites play? What is the relationship between economic elites and business elites? What kind of business leaders enter the political arena, and what are their strategies for political influence? Are Latin American elites transforming from oligarchs into rulers? What can be expected in terms of development, political transparency, and the reduction of inequalities in Latin American societies from knowledge of the structure, perceptions, forms of action, and organization of the elites?

In short, this GT has a dual objective: to critically analyze the different theoretical-methodological perspectives for the study of Latin American elites that, in turn, allow the construction of novel questions, analyses and diagnoses anchored in concrete socio-historical processes.

For this renewal, we propose the reorganization of the work around 3 sub-axes that will allow the approach to the articulating axis of the GT -the economic elites- from three fields: 1- political capture and institutions of privilege; 2- mechanisms of influence and power; and 3- multiple inequalities.

1. On Political Capture and Institutions of Privilege. Political capture occurs when the functions of the state are modified to serve particular interests (Dal Bó 2006). Similarly, large corporations can capture the state as a regulatory agent when they influence policies intended to regulate them (Innes 2014; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Captured states operate as vehicles for a select and unrepresentative set of private interests. Previous studies on state capture have highlighted the relevance of political-business relationships as a primary source of elite power, through the recruitment of businesspeople into government positions and monetary contributions to political campaigns (Carpenter and Moss 2013; Dal Bó 2006). First, the movement of businesspeople into politics, also known as the revolving door, can be a transfer of business efficiency to government, but also a source of conflicts of interest, cronyism, and corruption (Brezis and Cariolle 2015; Marques and Utting 2010). Furthermore, contributions to presidential elections can be a mechanism that fosters dependence on political parties and forges reciprocal relationships with politicians. This is especially true when there is little transparency in campaign financing, as is the case in Latin American countries (Casas-Zamora 2005). Another well-established line of research argues that capture is deeply entrenched in unequal societies. High income inequality weakens organized civil society, such as unions and social movements, which could veto such capture (Durand 2019). Simply put, when business elites are strong and civil organizations are weak, the state's capacity to regulate business elites is limited (Acemoglu and Robinson 2017).

2- On the influence and power of economic elites. Economic elites are a central actor in the definition, type and implementation of public policies (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013; Bull 2014a; Crabtree and Durand 2017; Fairfield 2015; Schneider 2012; Segovia 2002). The degrees of influence of elites allow us to understand the structural possibilities and limitations that exist for the design and implementation of public policies, particularly those that redistribute resources in a more progressive way (Martínez-Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea 2017). Classical literature posits two sources of power for elites to influence public policy: instrumental power and structural power (Miliband 1969; Mills 2000). The first refers to the ability of elites to actively participate in politics through electoral financing, revolving doors, or media capture (Bernhagen 2008; Crabtree and Durand 2017; Fairfield 2015). The second refers to the ability of elites to threaten to withdraw their capital from the country or to reduce their investments when they perceive that a policy may modify the status quo (Bernhagen 2008; Fairfield 2015). Distinguishing and understanding these two types of sources of power is fundamental to understanding the means and mechanisms by which elites exert their influence (Fairfield 2015). Furthermore, it allows us to predict that when either of these two powers is strong, the implementation of redistributive public policies will be difficult to carry out or even completely eliminated from the political agenda (Fairfield 2015). In terms of financing political campaigns in the region, various studies have documented that these donations facilitate access to and control of the political agenda for elites (Robles-Rivera 2018; Segovia 2005). Second, revolving doors allow elites to exert direct influence on public policy decisions by moving from holding management positions in companies to running government offices (Etzion and Davis 2008a). A topic of growing interest in the global north (Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder 2006; Etzion and Davis 2008b; Makkai and Braithwaite 1992; Tabakovic and Wollmann 2018) the region lacks systematic studies on the subject. Finally, there is media capture, which corresponds not only to the privileged access that elites have to these media, but also to the formal and informal mechanisms for producing, disseminating or censoring information. Furthermore, the literature on corporate power and fiscal policy argues that corporate cohesion is one of the most efficient resources for influencing policy (Castañeda 2017; Fairfield 2015). When business elites form a united opposition front, the chances of influencing policy tend to be stronger than if each faction acts independently. The debate about whether business elites are coherently organized or fragmented is not just a discussion about the internal organization of companies, but also a way of interpreting the structure that allows business elites to influence the State.

3- On Elites and Multiple Inequalities. The discussion surrounding inequalities has increasingly permeated academic debates over the last two decades. In the Latin American case, the commodities boom, increases in educational levels, and social and labor policies would explain a significant decrease in income inequality throughout Latin America, with the exception of Costa Rica (Trejos & Oviedo, 2012). In general, studies of inequality in Latin America have primarily sought to explain its measurement and its relationship with privileged institutions in fiscal matters. Despite these advances, we know far less about the perceptions of those who control resources and shape national decisions. Thus, if by definition elites control resources and power, their preferences will influence the decisions made regarding wealth distribution. In contrast to the increase in research on the Global South, few studies have analyzed countries in the Global South (Campos-Vazquez et al., 2022; Krozer, n.d.; López, 2014; Reis & Moore, 2005a). Thus, while there is recognition of the desire to improve social and income conditions to reduce crime and conflict, little is known about the low support for redistributive policies in the Global South (López et al., 2022). In their pioneering work, Elisa Reis and colleagues have documented that in Brazil, elites perceive inequality as a problem whose main social consequences are violence, crime, and political clientelism. For these authors, free-market solutions are the best remedy for poverty and inequality, which suggests, to some extent, that economic elites in particular are insensitive to inequality (Moraes Silva & Reis, 2018). In the Mexican case, Alice Krozer and colleagues have highlighted that the "wealth bubbles" in which elites operate result in these same elites, despite recognizing their privileged status compared to the rest of society, tending to perceive themselves as "poorer" than their exceptionally wealthier peers. Thus, while they express concern about inequality and its negative effects, they underestimate their own social standing and income (Krozer, 2018).