Statement from the CLACSO Latin American Left Working Group on repression in Chile
We are witnesses to and celebrate the broad and widespread popular rebellion that has kept Chilean society in motion for the past two weeks. Through the diverse forms of street protests, this movement has not only challenged the government of Sebastián Piñera, but also, through a wide range of demands, questioned the logic and effects of neoliberalism implemented during the dictatorship and intensified over the last thirty years. These demands encompass various sectors, such as those raised against the pension and healthcare systems, electricity and public transportation fare hikes, excessive tolls on privately operated highways, environmental pollution, profit-making in education, and collusion that exploits the needs of the majority. These are complemented by territorial conflicts and the struggles for autonomy of the Mapuche people, among many others.
But the most significant development is that they have all risen up together and simultaneously, generating a major political crisis that is still unfolding. The initial step taken by high school students who called for fare evasion on the subway in protest against the indiscriminate increase in public transportation costs was met with massive applause and accompanied by pot-banging protests, barricades, marches, and various attacks—using fire, stones, and graffiti—on symbols of economic and political power.
A popular rebellion has succeeded in reclaiming the streets and public spaces. While that act of jumping through the subway turnstiles marked the beginning of this movement, it is a protest linked to other social struggles led by political actors who, with less mass appeal and radicalism, have for the past 30 years loudly questioned the consequences of living under the norms imposed by a neoliberal governance model that perpetuates inequality and the exploitation of the vast majority. Indeed, Chile is among the most unequal countries in Latin America and the world.
The wealthiest 1% holds 33% of the wealth, while the poorest 50% of households have access to only 2,1%. More than half of salaried workers must survive on less than $400,000 pesos, and 7 out of 10 employees earn less than $550,000 pesos net per month, surviving thanks to debt. It is estimated that in Chile there are more than 11 million people over the age of 18 in debt, of whom 4.6 million are in default. The problem of debt, specifically for education, was a major issue brought to the forefront by the student movement of 2011.
However, less than a month ago, Sebastián Piñera could boast of presiding over a true oasis of calm within a convulsed Latin America, while he watched with disdain as his counterpart, Lenin Moreno, backtracked on the package of neoliberal measures in a raging Ecuador. The ministers in office could humiliate the population without fear, such as telling them to buy flowers because they were cheaper than basic necessities, suggesting they get up even earlier to pay the reduced fare on public transportation, or ordering them to hold a bingo game to finance roof repairs for schools in disrepair. This was the same Sebastián Piñera who, until then, had projected his leadership in the region and to the world, as host of two important summits, COP25 and APEC, which were to be held in Chile but which he had to cancel given the strength of the protests and the challenges to the economic model. The fury continued to build. Undoubtedly, the social upheaval in Chile, as the cradle and laboratory of neoliberalism, is a threat that resonates throughout the dominant sectors of the continent.
With varying degrees of intensity, the model is being implemented in Latin America, while diverse political and social forces must resist its effects on daily life. And that is why we must closely follow current events. One of the poorest countries in the region, Haiti, fed up with political, economic, and social abuses, has already endured several months of intense confrontations with President Moïse and his controversial request for aid from the United States. Piñera knows that the leadership of the right in the region depends in part on his fate. Therefore, the challenge of pacifying the country was imperative.
Therefore, Jair Bolsonaro was quick to threaten even more drastic measures if the unrest spread to his country, and Donald Trump—in a Cold War-era tactic—accused Russia of trying to destabilize the country and promote the protests. Even a Chilean newspaper like La Tercera, a mouthpiece for several corporations, blamed Cuban and Venezuelan agents for the subway fires. Consistent with the oligarchic response to the challenge posed by mobilized political actors throughout various episodes of our history, President Piñera did not hesitate to declare a State of Emergency and militarize the country. “We are at war” was his justification. The measure was applauded by the entire governing coalition. To date, there are 23 dead, more than one hundred mutilated by pellets, hundreds wounded, and thousands detained.
Every day, demonstrations are met with tear gas and water cannons. Faced with this latest affront, we, as the CLACSO Working Group, emphatically condemn these attacks on human rights through the indiscriminate use of force commanded by the right wing and neoliberal governance. This condemnation resonates even more strongly within a society that has yet to recover from the violence of the coup and has still not fulfilled its mandate of justice and punishment for those responsible for the crimes perpetrated during the dictatorship. We cannot forget that the so-called “negotiated transition” placed restrictions on demands for justice, allowing criminals to move freely through the streets, and that new recruits in the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement continue to be trained to persecute and neutralize those they consider their internal enemy.
Therefore, we observe and warn about the continuity of repressive policies and forces. History alerts us to the calls to normalize the country's situation under the guise of agreements and the so-called social agenda. For this reason, we urge vigilance regarding the institutional pact promoted by the government with its so-called "valid" interlocutors. A pact among the few, imposed from above, among the same old faces. A barrier to contain the advance of popular forces. As we experienced in 1987, it is about excluding the people using the old tactic of dividing forces, separating the condemnable from the acceptable, the peaceful from the violent, the social from the political. This is how the transition to democracy was orchestrated, a transition that reduced the political sphere to the realm of pen and paper, promoting the depoliticization and atomization of what until then had constituted a solid network of social and political organizations that confronted the dictatorship.
A massive and vigorous social force that was dismissed and silenced. Perhaps the greatest triumph of conservative forces, both in Chile and in the region, has been precisely the fragmentation of these struggles and the distrust of political alternatives that challenge the entire system and aspire to its radical transformation. Currently, what is an achievement in terms of mobilization and the breadth of demands may also be its greatest weakness.
While we believe it is necessary to strengthen discussion and organizational mechanisms such as the town hall meetings and popular assemblies emerging in neighborhoods, workplaces, and public spaces to work towards a Constituent Assembly; necessary to advance the demands put forward by the sectors grouped in the Social Unity Roundtable; and necessary to continue the process of mobilization and political socialization underway in the country, it is imperative to address the questions raised by the lack of organized expressions that aim not only to achieve fair distributive measures, but also serve as instruments to enhance the political and ideological awareness that sustains struggles beyond the immediate situation, defends the gains achieved, and articulates demands and proposals to confront the new and uncertain scenarios that will arise both in Chile and in the region.
November 2019
CLACSO Working Group
Latin American Left
