Cuba, Trump and the silence of the Caribbean

By Jacqueline Laguardia Martinez¹,
Coordinator of the CLACSO Working Group on Crisis, Responses and Alternatives in the Greater Caribbean

Originally published in Stabroek News February 21, 2026, in Guyana²

La reelección de Donald Trump, basada en su agenda de “America First”, significó un renovado compromiso de Washington con una política exterior sustentada en el unilateralismo y las sanciones. Para Cuba, implicó el regreso a una dinámica bilateral tensa iniciada en las primeras horas del segundo mandato de Trump, cuando revocó el Memorando Presidencial del 14 de enero de 2025 que —aprobado tardíamente por Biden— proponía la eliminación de Cuba de la lista de Estados patrocinadores del terrorismo. Posteriormente, en mayo de 2025, Cuba fue incluida en una segunda lista de sanciones, esta vez dirigida a penalizar a los Estados que no cooperan en la lucha contra el terrorismo.

Esta nueva campaña contra Cuba ha sido impulsada con entusiasmo por el Secretario de Estado Rubio. Sus padres emigraron a Estados Unidos en 1956, país donde él nació, y construyó su carrera política desde Florida con posiciones contrarias al gobierno revolucionario cubano. Durante sus dos visitas oficiales que lo llevaron a varios países de Centroamérica y el Caribe en el primer semestre de 2025, Rubio se reunió con diversos jefes de gobierno con quienes abordó temas de interés para Washington como la contención de China, el combate al crimen transnacional, la migración y la energía, entre otros. Como parte de su agenda, Rubio insistió en caracterizar los programas de cooperación médica internacional de Cuba como esquemas de trabajo forzado. Esta narrativa buscó persuadir a los países caribeños participantes a abandonar dichos acuerdos bajo el pretexto de evitar complicidad en presuntas violaciones de derechos humanos.

Such accusations were not well received by CARICOM representatives, given Cuba's rich history of South-South cooperation with Caribbean nations, which began with the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972. At that time, in open defiance of US policy, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago decided to establish ties with Havana. Cuba not only maintains diplomatic relations with all 14 independent CARICOM states but also has diplomatic missions in each of those countries, which in turn maintain embassies in Havana.

Ties with the regional bloc have been strengthened through the Cuba-CARICOM Summits, the first of which took place in 2002. These meetings are held every three years, except for the eighth, which was brought forward to December 2022 to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of relations. At that meeting, the achievements of cooperation in the health, education, sports, vocational training, disaster risk management, and climate change adaptation sectors, among others, were recognized. Figures from 2024 indicated that a total of 14.542 Cuban health workers had provided services in 21 Caribbean territories, including all CARICOM member states. More than 3.000 Caribbean health professionals had graduated from Cuban universities (Cubadebate, 2024). On the diplomatic front, the consistency of the Caribbean countries in their solidarity with Cuba stands out, as they support each year the resolution presented to the United Nations General Assembly to denounce the US blockade.

However, the positive balance derived from Cuba-CARICOM ties seems to be shifting, especially after the attacks against Venezuela on January 3, 2026. This possibility is not surprising to those who have followed the cautious reactions of the Caribbean not only to the recent events in Caracas—despite Venezuela being a CARICOM Observer Member—but also in the months leading up to the attacks on vessels involved in “narco-terrorism,” which, as of January 2026, had claimed the lives of at least 128 people in the Caribbean and the Pacific since the first recorded incident in September 2025 (Osgood, 2026). At the time, most Caribbean governments limited themselves to issuing moderate criticisms of the White House’s disregard for the international order. However, there was no shortage of politicians and opinion leaders who supported Trump’s hardline policies. This public dissent among CARICOM members, which even went so far as to question the designation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a “Zone of Peace” and the relevance of the regional bloc today, is an unequivocal sign not only of a different geopolitical moment, but also of the rightward shift of several governments that seem more interested in cultivating their friendship with Washington than in maintaining their regional alliances and strengthening regional integration.

Following the attack on Caracas, Washington's aggression against Cuba has intensified. Trump's predictions of Havana's imminent fall are accompanied by new measures aimed at strangling the island's economy, the most recent being the executive order that took effect on January 30, titled "Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba." The document states that the policies, practices, and actions of the Cuban government constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. Cuba is accused of destabilizing the region and collaborating with Russia, China, Iran, and groups considered terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. The order stipulates that tariffs will be imposed on products from any country that directly or indirectly supplies crude oil or petroleum products to Cuba.

In the Caribbean, this directive has not gone unnoticed. Although several voices have been raised to condemn Trump's policy of tightening the noose around the island, there have been no official statements from foreign ministries or other Caribbean government representatives expressing solidarity with the Cuban people. Almost three weeks after the executive order was published, politicians in the region not only remain silent, but have also discreetly aligned themselves with Washington's desire to end cooperation with Cuba—always clarifying that such decisions are made sovereignly and not as a result of US pressure.

In line with this stance, Caribbean governments have opted to wait for the expiration of agreements signed with Cuba before deciding not to continue them, as Guyana did, justifying the non-renewal of the medical collaboration program by deeming it unnecessary under current conditions (Trotz, 2026). Another approach has been to reject scholarship offers from Cuba to study at its universities. This is the case of Trinidad and Tobago, which argued that the island's difficult economic conditions are not suitable for its citizens, whom they must support by sending food and other supplies while they study there (Polo, 2026).

Caribbean politicians are focused on avoiding a confrontation with the White House that could lead to costly trade reprisals for small economies whose main trading partner is the United States—a scenario that could eventually translate into electoral defeat. Other reasons behind Caribbean reluctance lie in the close ties these territories maintain with the United States regarding security against transnational threats such as drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and irregular migration. These arguments are used to justify the growing US presence at military bases and the massive deployment of military assets in the Caribbean Sea, whose mere presence serves as a warning of the potential consequences of dissent. Furthermore, the Caribbean diaspora in the United States, along with a considerable number of CARICOM citizens with US visas and residency, constitutes another deterrent, given that they could be affected if immigration policies are tightened to the detriment of nationals from countries in the regional bloc, as has already occurred with Haiti, Antigua and Barbuda, and Dominica (Wilkinson, 2026).

The litmus test for relations between Cuba and the CARICOM countries could come in the next few weeks during the ninth Cuba-CARICOM Summit, scheduled to be held in Havana in March 2026, if it ultimately takes place as announced. As the date approaches, no news has emerged regarding preparations for the meeting, and doubts are growing about whether it will be canceled or, if it does take place, what level of representation each country will send to Havana.

Las acciones recientes del Caribe indican un claro alineamiento con la política exterior estadounidense, en marcado contraste con la postura históricamente sostenida, que combinaba cierta dosis de realismo con la defensa de principios fundamentales del orden internacional y el multilateralismo. Si el Caribe insiste en avanzar en esta dirección, la región podría estar contribuyendo a la política de aislamiento impuesta a Cuba desde Washington y respaldando, con su aquiescencia y silencio, las consecuencias humanitarias que la política estadounidense traerá para el pueblo cubano.

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Highlighted

• Cubadebate. (2024, May 29). Cuba's Minister of Public Health thanks the government for its support.
  GAVI alliance to strengthen the Expanded National Immunization Program.
  http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2024/05/29/agradece-ministro-de-salud-publica-de-cuba-
  support-of-the-gavi-alliance-to-strengthening-the-expanded-national-program-of-
  immunization/
• Osgood, Brian (2026). US military kills two people in latest attack on vessel in the Pacific,
  February 6. (See https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/6/us-military-kills-two-people-in-)
  latest-attack-on-vessel-in-the-pacific
• Polo, Dareece (2026). T&T denies US pressure to end medical study program with
  Cuba, February 4. (See https://www.guardian.co.tt/news/tt-denies-us-pressure-to-end-)
  medical-study-programme-with-cuba-6.2.2507414.c81cf02a4a
• Trotz, Alissa (2026). The debt is unpayable (2008) The debt is unpayable, February 10.
  En https://www.stabroeknews.com/2026/02/10/features/in-the-diaspora/the-debt-is-
  unpayable-2008-the-debt-is-unpayable/print/
• Wilkinson, Bert (2026). Caribbean governments agree to take US sports, January 15. At https://amsterdamnews.com/news/2026/01/15/cribbean-governments-agree-to-take-us-deportees/

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1. Senior Lecturer at the Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies, St.Augustine campus. Coordinator of the CLACSO Working Group “Crisis, responses and alternatives in the Greater Caribbean”. ↩︎
2. First published at the Stabroek News, on February 21, 2026, Guyana.
   https://www.stabroeknews.com/2026/02/21/features/in-the-diaspora/cuba-trump-and-the-silence-of-the-caribbean/ ↩︎